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Arriving at a reasonable, fair approach to the taxation of enterprises
which are engaged in income producing activities in more than one juris-
diction has been a vexatious problem for the past century, both interna-
tionally and within the United States. The taxing entities are concerned
about receiving their due from enterprises which enjoy the benefits of
carrying on various activities within their borders; the enterprises are
concerned about more than one jurisdiction taxing the enterprise's same
tax base, whether it be property or net income. In the international set-
ting, the pattern which has evolved for addressing the concerns of both
sides is the ratification of treaties between two countries1 to deal with
these issues. The common approach is to treat an enterprise's business
income earning activities within a particular country as if they were the
activities of a separate enterprise, even though such activities actually
may have been conducted by a mere branch of a foreign based
enterprise.2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S. Wake Forest University 1968; J.D.
Florida State University 1974; LL.M. (Taxation) University of Florida 1975; LL.M. London School
of Economics, University of London 1980.
** B.A. University of Arizona 1975; J.D. University of Arizona 1979; LL.M. (Taxation) Univer-
sity of Florida 1983.
I In the international context, it is customary to refer to sovereign nations as "states." See, eg.,
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (3d ed. 1979). Because this article
discusses both nations and the states of the United States, however, to avoid confusion the term
"states" will be used exclusively to refer to the members of the union of the United States of
America.
2 For a discussion of the separate entity approach, see infra notes 70-113 and accompanying
text.
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In the United States, the various states initially applied their respec-
tive taxes on, or measured their taxes by, corporate net income in the
same manner as countries did, by utilizing the separate entity approach.
In the 1920s, however, many states began to employ a different ap-
proach-formulary apportionment. States applied formulary apportion-
ment to determine the tax base of a multijurisdictional enterprise
engaged in a unitary business.3 The approach proceeds from an eco-
nomic, rather than geographic, perspective. It involves the notion that
the overall net income (or loss) of a multijurisdictional enterprise is at-
tributable, in part, to all of its property and activities, wherever they may
be located. Therefore, states determined the net income tax base for a
particular state by multiplying the overall net income by a fraction, the
numerator being the quantity of income producing property and activi-
ties within that state, and the denominator being the total quantity of
income producing property and activities.
Ideally, a system of fairly distributed tax burdens would have all
taxing jurisdictions use a uniform approach to determine their fair share
of a multijurisdictional enterprise's tax base. In the international setting,
the League of Nations quickly dropped early proposals for a multilateral
tax treaty addressing the problem of double taxation in favor of a series
of bilateral treaties with the same objective. Differences in tax systems,
languages, currencies and accounting principles did not lend themselves
to multilateral treatment, but were best dealt with between two countries
at a time in a bilateral treaty. The League of Nations, and, later the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development proposed
model treaties in an attempt to achieve uniformity, but deviations from
the models always crept into the terms of each new bilateral treaty.
Nonetheless, the ideal is a uniform, world-wide approach, agreed to by
all countries in a multilateral treaty.
In the United States, many states have sought the objective of uni-
formity by enacting the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act (UDITPA). In addition, many of those same states have entered
into the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC). The salutary objective of both
the UDITPA and the MTC is to provide uniform rules for the allocation
and apportionment of income, in order to facilitate both compliance and
enforcement, as well as to reduce the likelihood of double taxation. The
promised uniformity, however, has been at the same time both illusive
and elusive. Experience with the UDITPA and the MTC in the United
States has demonstrated that a multilateral treaty would not achieve uni-
formity amongst the numerous sovereign countries of the world, primar-
3 For a discussion of the unitary business concept see infra notes 267-76.
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ily because there is no paramount supervisory body in the international
arena. At the same time, uniformity could be achieved within the United
States by pre-emptive federal legislation uniformly interpreted and ap-
plied to all of the states. The uniform application of an apportionment
formula to distribute the tax base of a multijurisdictional unitary enter-
prise would avoid many of the problems of the separate entity approach,
producing a fair, equitable determination of the tax base for state income
taxes.
Part II of this article will examine the treatment of business income
of multinational enterprises under tax treaties, and Part III discusses the
determination of the tax base of such enterprises. Part IV examines the
evolution of the law pertaining to state imposed taxes on, or measured
by, the net business income of multistate unitary enterprises, the issues of
jurisdiction and the determination of the tax base. Part V addresses vari-
ous attempts to achieve uniformity in state taxation. Part VI suggests
that in the international setting, the goal of uniformity is unlikely to be
achieved by a multilateral treaty, but that within the United States, pre-
emptive federal legislation should be enacted.
II. JURISDICTION To TAX BUSINESS INCOME UNDER TAX TREATIES
The- first bilateral tax treaty directed towards preventing double tax-
ation was signed in Berlin on June 21, 1899, by representatives of Aus-
tria-Hungary and Prussia.' Although the United States did not become a
party to a double taxation treaty until 1932,1 the intervening three de-
cades saw much activity in the field of international tax law.6 Bilateral
tax conventions became commonplace among the European countries.7
4 Treaty for the Prevention of Double Taxation, June 21, 1899, Austria-Hungary Prussia, 29
Martens Nouveau Recueil 407 (2d Ser.). Earlier treaties dealt with taxation, for example, the 1843
agreement between France and Belgium, which authorized the exchange of information to aid in the
effective collection of taxes, is considered by some to be the first international tax agreement, but it
was not concerned with double taxation. E. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL
FIsCAL COOPERATION 52-53 (1928).
5 Convention concerning Double Taxation and protocol, April 27, 1932, United States-France,
49 Stat. 3145. T.S. No. 885.
6 Actually, it was not until after World War I that treaty activity accelerated. Prior to that
time, low tax rates and stable international commerce provided little impetus for concluding general
income tax treaties. A. EHRENZWEIG & F. KOCH, INCOME TAX TREATIES 6-7 (1949).
7 See Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad,
Part I, 2 INT'L LAW. 692-93 (1968); Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief
Through International Agreement, 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 73, 102-07 (1945). In addition to
bilateral conventions, a multilateral agreement was signed in 1922. Convention for the Purpose of
Avoiding Double Taxation between Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania and the Kingdom of
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, April 6, 1922, League of Nations, Doc. C.345 M. 102 1928, II, at 73
(1928).
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The League of Nations, with the cooperation of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce,8 followed a recommendation of the 1920 International
Financial Conference9 to undertake a study of the problems of interna-
tional double taxation from an administrative and practical perspective. 10
The Financial Committee of the League of Nations designated a group of
Technical Experts" to perform the study, and they presented their final
report, including what was to be the first model bilateral treaty, to the
Financial Committee in April of 1927.12
Because double taxation is a consequence of overlapping assertions
of tax jurisdiction, 3 the solution to the problem lies in unravelling those
competing jurisdictional claims, and delineating the circumstances under
which one country or the other may impose its taxes. The two natural
competing jurisdictional claimants are the country in which the taxpayer
resides (country of residence) 4 and the country in which the income is
derived (country of source). Although many factors are involved in ne-
gotiating the dividing lines, the problem may be viewed either with an
eye on the type or nature of the tax to be levied, or on the item of income
in question.
The first model bilateral tax treaty produced under the auspices of
the League of Nations, in 1927, approached the problem by first consid-
ering the nature of the tax to be imposed. 5 The model convention di-
8 Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.115 M.55 1925 II(F.212), at 7-
8 (1925).
9 Report presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion,
League of Nations, Doc. C.216 M.85 1927 II, at 5 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Report I].
10 A theoretical study of double taxation was undertaken by four economists at the direction of
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations in 1923. Report on Double Taxation, League of
Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 F.19 (1923). For a thorough analysis by one of the economists who partici-
pated in that study, see E. SELIGMAN, supra note 4.
11 The experts were representatives appointed from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Great
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. They were all high officials of the fiscal administra-
tions of the respective countries, but were designated "technical experts" to make clear that they
were not official government representatives, and thus were not constrained from expressing views
contrary to their country's official policies. Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, L.N. Doc. C.115
M.55 1925 II (F.212) at 3, 6. Significantly, most of the members came from capital-importing or
debtor countries, and the United States was not represented. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 141-42.
12 Report I, supra note 9. A preliminary report was submitted in 1925; see Double Taxation and
Tax Evasion, supra note 8.
13 "International Double Taxation arises where various sovereign countries exercise their sover-
eigu power to subject the same person to taxes of a substantially similar character on the same
object." F. KocH, THE DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 3 (1947).
14 The "country of residence" is the modern concept. Se e.g., Treasury Department's Model
Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, art. 4, 1 TAX TREATIS (CCH) 158. The early work of the
League of Nations used the term "fiscal domicile," the place where an individual had his permanent
home. See, eg., Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, supra note 8, at 20-21.
15 The Technical Experts who participated generally followed the report of the economists, but
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vided direct taxes into two categories, impersonal or schedular taxes
(imp6ts r6els),16 and personal or general taxes (impt personnel).'7  The
model convention did not attempt to define further the two categories of
taxes, leaving to the contracting countries the determination of which of
their taxes would fall into either category. 8 As general rules, however,
impersonal taxes could be imposed by the country of source,' 9 and per-
sonal taxes by the country of residence.20
Countries impose impersonal or schedular taxes (im6ts r6els), on in-
come arising from specific sources, regardless of the nationality, resi-
dence, domicile, or other personal circumstances of the taxpayer; imp6ts
rdels are not imposed on the income of persons as such.21 Because of the
nature of impts rdels, the 1927 model treaty resolved double taxation
principally by designating the source from which various items of income
were derived. Under this regime, a country could tax income from im-
movable property where the property was situated;22 a country in which
the debtor resided could tax the debtor's interest income;23 and the coun-
try where the "real centre of management" of a dividend-paying corpora-
tion was situated could tax the corporation's dividend income.24 The
country where the taxpayer maintained a "permanent establishment"
could tax the taxpayers business profits.25 This provision reflected an
evolved acceptance of restricting a country's taxing jurisdiction until a
because of differing political backgrounds and lack of sophistication with the distinctions drawn by
the economists, there were some differences. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 143-65.
16 Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation, arts. 2-9 [hereinafter
cited as Bilateral Convention], reprinted in Report I, supra note 9, at 10-11.
17 Id. arts. 10, 11-12. For a discussion of the classification of taxes, see E. SELIGMAN, supra note
4, at 58-87.
18 Report I, supra note 9, at 13.
19 Bilateral Convention, supra note 16, art. 2, at 10.
20 Id. art. 10, at 11.
21 The concept of impdts rdels is difficult to understand for someone familiar with United States
tax law because, like the United Kingdom's system, the United States tax system is based on the
personal or general income tax, and imp6ts rdels has no precise equivalent in the English language.
Confusion may also arise for those familiar with the British "schedular" taxes. However, those
schedules are only divisions for classifying income in computing the tax base; the British tax is a
general or personal tax, not an imp6ts rdels. Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, supra note 8, at 15;
E. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 58-87.
22 Bilateral Convention, supra note 16, art. 2, at 10.
23 The general rule was modified "if such income [was] paid in one of the Contracting States to
persons domiciled in the other Contracting State, the tax applicable thereto [was to be] refunded
upon production of proper evidence. In such case the said income [could] be taxed in the State of
domicile of the creditor." Id. art. 3, at 10.
24 Id. art. 4.
25 Id. art. 5, at 10-11. The term "business profits" is used in the text as a short-hand reference to
the phrase in the treaty, "[i]nrome from any industrial, commercial, or agricultural undertaking and
from any other trades or professions." Id.
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significant level of taxpayer activity took place within the country. It
was burdensome to transnational business if a nonresident incurred tax
liability merely by selling its products in a country through an independ-
ent agent, or simply by sending salesmen into the country to solicit or-
ders for acceptance or rejection by the head office. Instead, it became
commonly accepted for countries to tax a nonresident's business profits
only if the nonresident maintained some significant physical presence
within the country as a fixed place of business.26 The 1927 draft conven-
tion designated "real centres of management, affiliated companies,
branches, factories, agencies, warehouses, offices, [and] depots" as per-
manent establishments, while not regarding activities of an independent
agent such as a broker or commission agent as a permanent establish-
ment of the nonresident.27
The 1927 model convention avoided double taxation of business in-
come of a transnational enterprise by providing that if an enterprise
maintained a permanent establishment in each of two treaty partner
countries, "each of the two [should] tax the portion of the income pro-
duced in its territory."28 Countries would determine the amount of in-
come produced by each permanent establishment by reference to the
enterprise's books and records, but "[iun the absence of accounts showing
[such] income separately and in proper form," designated authorities of
the two countries were to confer and "come to an arrangement as to the
rules for apportionment. ' 29 The convention itself contained no further
guidance for the apportionment of business profits. The "Commentary"
provided by the drafters simply noted that "[the] rules [would] vary es-
sentially according to the undertakings concerned," and indicated that
important factors for consideration might include "the amount of capital
involved,. . . the number of workers, the wages paid, [and] receipts." 0
The 1927 convention also addressed double taxation pertaining to
personal taxes (impdt personnel). If an entity became subject to tax on its
entire income by two countries, because it maintained a fiscal domicile in
each, "the personal tax [was to] be imposed in each. . . in proportion to
the period of stay during the fiscal year."'" In addition, certain items of
income might be taxed twice because of overlap between the personal tax
imposed by the country of residence, and an impersonal tax imposed by
26 For a discussion of the evolution of the "permanent establishment" concept, see Carroll, supra
note 7, at 699-701.
27 Bilateral Convention, supra note 16, art. 5.
28 Id
29 Id
30 Id Commentary to art. 5, at 15.
31 Id art. 11, at 12.
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the country of source. If the country of residence did not levy imper-
sonal taxes on its residents, then the country of residence would allow a
tax credit 32 against the personal tax for impersonal taxes paid to the
country of source. The Convention limited the amount of the credit to
the lesser of the personal tax due to the country of residence, computed
exclusively on items of income which the source country taxed or the tax
paid to the country of source.33
In 1928, a conference of government experts took place in Geneva to
discuss the 1927 draft convention.34 The experts affirmed the general
concepts of the 1927 draft, but the experts acknowledged that the draft
was unsuited to the tax systems of some countries, 3 because the 1927
draft was designed primarily for countries imposing both personal and
impersonal taxes.36 In response, the conference of government experts
proposed three model conventions for approval. The first, Draft No. Ia,
was essentially the same as the 1927 draft, since it retained the distinction
between personal and impersonal taxes,3 7 while the other two drafts
made no such distinction.
Draft No. Ib offered a model for conventions between two countries
whose tax systems assert jurisdiction principally by residence.38  Draft
No. Ib accorded primary authority to tax to the country of residence, the
source country; only to tax certain specified categories of income, such as
income from immovable property, and business profits attributable to a
permanent establishment. 39 The second draft ameliorated double taxa-
tion in the same manner as the 1927 draft provided. If a taxpayer had a
32 The Convention allowed the taxpayer a "deduct[ion] from its personal tax." Id. art. 10, at 11.
The modem expression of this concept is "tax credit." See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (1985).
33 The credit further may be limited by some agreed percentage of the residence country's per-
sonal tax to prevent a taxpayer from wholly escaping tax if all of his income is foreign source.
Report I, supra note 9, at 17.
34 27 countries, including the United States, were represented at the conference. Report
Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion,
League of Nations Doc. C.562 M.178 1928 II. at 5 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Report II]. J.
HERNDON, RELIEF FROM INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 175 (1932).
35 Some countries, such as Austria and Germany, had already signed treaties dividing tax juris-
diction according to rules which made no distinction between personal and impersonal taxes. Other
countries, such as South Africa and the United Kingdom, did not impose impersonal taxes. Sum-
mary of the Observations Received by August 30th, 1928, from the Governments on the Report
Submitted by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of
Nations Doc. C.495 M.147 1928 II (1928).
36 Report II, supra note 34, at 7.
37 Draft Convention No. Ia, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, at 7-9.
38 Draft Convention No. Ib, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, at 16-18. This draft had its
genesis in proposals prepared by the American and British representatives. J. HERNDON, supra note
34, at 235.
39 Draft Convention No. Ib, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, arts. 1 & 2, at 16-17.
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fiscal domicile in each country during the year, each country could im-
pose a tax in proportion to the time the taxpayer spent there.4' If a
permanent establishment existing in each country earned business profits,
"each [country could] impose [a] tax applicable to that part of the in-
come produced on its territory.' 41 Unlike the 1927 draft, however,
neither Draft No. Ia nor No. Ib suggested the taxpayer's books and
records be used in determining the portion of total profit to be attributa-
ble to each permanent establishment.42 Instead, the 1928 drafts simply
provided that "[t]he competent administrations of the two Contracting
[countries should] come to an arrangement as to the basis of apportion-
ment,"43 the draft deliberately left open the question of the allocation of
profits.44
Countries with tax systems differing in nature, but not fitting into
the personal/impersonal mold, were to use Draft No. Ic.41 In contrast to
Draft No. Ib, this draft did not attempt to establish primacy of residence
country jurisdiction. It simply listed certain categories of income and
granted jurisdiction to the source country. As with the other two 1928
drafts, Draft No. Ic provided that the country in which a permanent
establishment was situated would tax the establishment's business profits,
and if a taxpayer had permanent establishments in each country, each
country was to "tax the portion of the income produced in its terri-
tory."'46 Also, this third draft left to the competent administrations of the
two countries discretion to devise an appropriate basis for apportionment
of profits between the two permanent establishments.47
The United States and various European countries widely used the
three draft conventions produced at the 1928 conference as the basis for
40 Id. art. 1, at 16.
41 Id. art. 2, at 16.
42 Compare Bilateral Convention, supra note 16, art. 5, at 11 with Bilateral Conventions for the
Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of Direct Taxes, Draft Convention No. Ia, art.
5, and Draft Convention No. Ib, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, art. 2(B), at 8, 16. The
question of apportionment was discussed at some length by the delegates. Some felt that provisions
for apportionment should be spelled out in the convention itself, while others believed such rules
would conflict with their own domestic law and thus should not be included. J. HERNDON, supra
note 34, at 203-05.
43 Draft Convention No. Ib, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, art. 2(B), at 16.
44 Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Fourth Session of the Committee, League of
Nations Doc. C.399 M.204 1933 II A, at 2 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Fiscal Report].
45 Draft Convention No. Ic, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, at 19-21. This draft had its
genesis in proposals prepared by the French representative. J. HERNDON, supra note 34, at 235.
46 Draft Convention No. Ic, art. 3, reprinted in Report II, supra note 34, at 19.
47 Id
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numerous bilateral tax treaties.48 In the meantime, however, the League
of Nations continued its work on the problems of double taxation. The
Fiscal Committee of the League met again in 1931 and refined the 1928
model conventions. The Committee prepared two drafts, but in contrast
to the earlier bilateral conventions, these drafts were in the form of multi-
lateral conventions.49 A fourth session of the Fiscal Committee took
place in 1933 and the Committee prepared another multilateral draft
convention.5" While minor differences existed between the three multi-
lateral drafts, they all possessed the common theme of according prefer-
ence in jurisdiction to the country of residence, and continued the
separate-entity/arm's-length approach of permitting the source country
to tax the business income of the permanent establishment of a non-resi-
dent enterprise.
The drafters of the 1933 model convention were able to use informa-
tion obtained from a survey51 of the tax systems of over twenty nations,
and the states of Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin.5 2 The sur-
vey's report and recommendations reflected the separate-entity/arm's-
length approach for averting double taxation primarily because a major-
ity of the tax systems surveyed employed this approach. 3
At a conference in Mexico, in 1943, the Fiscal Committee produced
the penultimate model convention drafted under the auspices of the
League of Nations. Unlike earlier conferences, Latin and South Ameri-
can countries were heavily represented, 4 and they brought an economic
48 Rosenbloom & Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 365 (1981).
49 These were referred to as Draft Plurilateral Conventions "A" and "B". Draft "A" attempted
to resolve double taxation problems for both residents and non-residents, while Draft "B" only ad-
dressed non-residents. It was hoped that the plurilateral, or multilateral, conventions would en-
courage countries to alleviate double taxation by adopting uniform legislation, a method to be
preferred over bilateral conventions. Report to the Council on the Work of the Third Session of the
Committee, League of Nations Doc. C.415 M.171 1931 II A at 3, 13-16 (1931).
50 Fiscal Report, supra note 44. A revision of this convention was published by the Committee
in Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Fifth Session of the Committee, League of Na-
tions Doc. C.252 M.124 1935 II A (1935) [hereinafter cited as Fiscal Report II].
51 The survey was conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations and was financed by a
grant obtained by Professor Adams from the Rockefeller Foundation. 1 Taxation of Foreign and
National Enterprises, League of Nations Doc. C.73 M.38 1932 II A at 3 (1932). The subtitle of this
report was "A Study of the Tax Systems and the Methods of Allocation of the Profits of Enterprises
Operating in More Than One Country."
52 Carroll, supra note 7, at 703-04. For a more anecdotal account of the survey, see generally M.
CARROLL, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES OF AN INTERNATIONAL TAx LAWYER (1978).
53 Carroll, supra note 7, at 704-05; Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, supra note 51,
at 33-35, 53-55.
54 No Latin American country was represented at the 1928 conference, while at the Mexico
conference, all of the countries represented (with the exception of Canada and the United States)
were in Latin or South America. Carroll, supra note 7 at 707-08.
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perspective very different from that of the United States and the industri-
alized countries of Europe. The model draft approved at the Mexico
Conference55 reflected that perspective by reversing the emphasis of the
earlier models, by giving primacy of jurisdiction to the country of source,
rather than the country of residence.5 6 In addition, the 1943 convention
found the concept of "permanent establishment" contained in the earlier
models to be too narrowly drawn. The Mexico Draft provided that the
country where the business of activity was carried out could tax indus-
trial, commercial or agricultural profits, regardless of the existence of a
permanent establishment." When the full Fiscal Committee met for the
final time in 1946, in London the Committee reversed this shift in per-
spective. The London Draft returned to emphasizing the taxing power of
the country of residence, and to the country of source taxing business
profits of an enterprise only if a permanent establishment was located
there.
58
After World War II, the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) picked up the development of model interna-
tional tax treaties from the League of Nations.59 The Fiscal Committee of
the OECD published a draft double taxation convention in 1963, 0 and
revised it in 1977.61 In 1976, the United States, although basically satis-
fied with the OECD model, chose to promulgate a model convention for
55 Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of International Double Taxation and Fiscal
Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.2 M.2 1945 II A at 5 (1945).
56 Carroll, supra note 7, at 708; Wang, supra note 7, at 96. The Latin and South American
preference for source country jurisdiction is seen today in the Model Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation Between Member Countries and Other Countries Outside the Andean Subregion
(Andean Model), reprinted in Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Devel-
oped and Developing Countries at 168-73 U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/94 (1979).
57 Carroll, supra note 7, at 708, 712-15. In addition, the Mexico Draft allocated profits from
producing agricultural products, minerals and other natural resources to the country in which such
items or materials were produced or extracted. "[Ilf a corporation of one Contracting State [had] an
establishment in the other which produce[d] raw materials which [were] sold at an establishment in
the first State at world market prices the entire profit [was] to be allocated to the State where the raw
materials were produced." Id. at 713.
58 London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions, Commentary and Text, League of Nations Doc.
C.88 M.88 1946 II A (1946); Carroll, supra note 7, at 712-15.
59 The OECD was established in 1961 to replace the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) which, in turn, had been established in 1948 by the countries which were recipi-
ents of the U.S. Marshall Aid program. B. TEw, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 20, 128 n.2 (2d ed. 1982).
60 Report of the OECD Fiscal Committee, 1963, Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income
and Capital. See Kragen, Double Income Taxation Treatie" The O.E. CD. Draft, 52 CALIF. L. REv.
306 (1964).
61 OECD Model Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on In-
come and Capital, I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 151 (1977).
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its use as a starting point in negotiations of bilateral tax conventions.62
The United States model was oriented more closely than the OECD
model to the United States Internal Revenue Code, but retained the basic
thrust of according primary jurisdiction to the country of residence. The
United States Model allowed a source country to tax business profits only
if a permanent establishment could be found, and the source country was
to measure the tax base by the separate-entity/arm's-length approach.
The Treasury Department modified the 1976 United States model in
1977,63 and published a revised, Proposed Draft, in 1981.
6
The model conventions produced by the OECD and the United
States were oriented toward negotiations between two countries with
roughly equal flows of capital and income.65 However, income and capi-
tal flows between developed and lesser developed countries are generally
unequal, if not unidirectional. Treaty provisions producing fair results
between equals may result in unfair treatment of unequals. In recogni-
tion of this, a Group of Experts, appointed by the Secretary General of
the United Nations, issued guidelines in 1979 for the negotiation of tax
treaties between developed and developing countries,66 and in 1980, the
United Nations published a model convention.6 7 Though the U.N.
model differs from the OECD and U.S. models in many respects; the
primary difference is that it shifts the emphasis towards granting jurisdic-
tion to tax certain items of income to the source country.68 Notwith-
standing these differences the U.N. model retains the familiar scheme for
the taxation of business profits-the source country is granted jurisdic-
tion only if a permanent establishment is present, and the source country
measures the tax base by the separate-entity/arm's-length approach.69
62 Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, U.S. Treasury Press Release, May 18,
1976. For a comparative analysis of both model treaties, see Patrick, A Comparison of the United
States and OECD Model Income Tax Conventions, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 613 (1978).
63 Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty of May 17, 1977, 1 TAx TREATIES (CC-)
1153.
64 Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, supra note 14. For an
analysis, see Burke, Report on Proposed United States Model Income Tax Treaty, 23 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 219 (1983).
65 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 48, at 392-93.
66 Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing
Countries, supra note 56. See Surry, United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax
Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1978).
67 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing
Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102 (1980), 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 171 (1982).
68 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 48, at 393.
69 Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing
Countries, supra note 56, at 53-58. This provision was explained in the "Observations" of the Group
of Experts:
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III. THE SEPARATE-ENTITY/ARM'S LENGTH APPROACH TO TAXING
BUSINESS PROFITS OF A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT
As indicated in the previous section, the evolution of model and bi-
lateral treaties to prevent double taxation began at a time when the gen-
eral income tax was in its infancy.7" The early treaties were therefore,
mostly concerned with classifying various types of taxes a country might
impose and assigning the power to impose a particular tax to the country
of residence or country of source.7' Countries did, however, impose
taxes on, or measure taxes by, the income of business establishments, and
the early model treaties addressed the potential for double taxation of
business profits of a transnational enterprise by employing the "perma-
nent establishment" concept.7 2
The concept of "permanent establishment" served two functions.
First, it supplied a mutually agreed upon jurisdictional threshold. Unless
the nonresident's business activities within a taxing country reached the
level of a permanent establishment, no tax was imposed on business prof-
its of the enterprise, even though the source of those profits was within
the taxing country. 73 This function allowed transnational businesses to
The most relevant question in international tax practice concerning business profits relates
to the facts which make an enterprise liable to taxation on its profits in a foreign country. There
is general acceptance of the so-called "arm's length" rule embodied in the OECD Draft Model
Convention. According to this rule, the profits attributable to a permanent establishment are
those which would be earned by the establishment if it were a wholly independent entity dealing
with its head office as if it were a distinct and separate enterprise operating under conditions and
selling at prices prevailing in the regular market. The profits so attributable are normally the
profits shown on the books of the establishment. Nevertheless, this rule permits the authorities
of the country in which the permanent establishment is located to rectify the accounts of the
enterprise, so as to reflect properly income which the establishment would have earned if it were
an independent enterprise dealing with its head office at arm's length.
Id. at 56.
70 See E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (2d ed. 1914). Indeed, the problems of double taxation
are found primarily in the forms of taxation, such as the general income tax, which have been devel-
oped to suit modern economic conditions. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 11.
71 The "classification and assignment" approach taken in the early work on double taxation by
the League of Nations is considered by some to be the most significant aspect of its work, because of
its pervasive and enduring influence in virtually all tax treaties up to the present. Rosenbloom &
Langbein, supra note 48, at 366.
72 For example, the League of Nations' first model convention provided: Income from any in-
dustrial, commercial or agricultural undertaking and from any other trades or professions shall be
taxable in the State in which the persons controlling the undertaking or engaged in the trade or
profession possess permanent establishments. Bilateral Convention, supra note 16, art. 5, at 10.
Double taxation was still possible, however, if the country of fiscal domicile imposed a tax on all the
profits of a taxpayer, including those which had been allocated to the source country. In such
circumstances, double taxation was to be ameliorated by the residence country granting a credit in
the amount of the lesser of the amount of tax imposed by the source country, or the amount of tax
which would have been levied by the country of residence solely upon the items of income arising in
the source country. Id. art. 10, at 11.
73 This provision in a tax convention would effectively override domestic law which might pro-
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expand more freely. For example, an enterprise could test the market for
its products within a foreign country by arranging for sales through in-
dependent agents. If the enterprise found a sufficient market to exist,
then the enterprise could expand operations in that country by opening a
branch office, by sending in permanent employees, or by other means. In
the meantime, the country in which the goods were sold would not tax
the business profits generated by sales completed by the independent
agents.74
The second function of the "permanent establishment" concept was
in computing the tax base of the transnational enterprise in the nonresi-
dence country where a permanent establishment was located. Again,
early bilateral and model treaties reflected the prevailing economic theo-
ries of the time of imposing taxes either on property or identifiable trans-
actions. If a country imposed taxes on an entity because of its
relationship with the taxing state, the power to tax was supported either
by some notion of benefit which the country provided to the taxpayer, or
by some obligation the taxpayer owed to the country because of their
special relationship.7 5 A source country would properly impose income
taxes on a transnational enterprise only to the extent the enterprise had
profits clearly attributable to a permanent establishment within the tax-
ing country.7 6 From this perspective, for example, it made no difference
to Italy whether a transnational enterprise domiciled in Germany had an
overall loss during a tax year; if the enterprise's permanent establishment
in Italy had a net profit, it would be subject to income tax by Italy.77 The
converse was true as well; if the Italian permanent establishment showed
a loss, no Italian income tax would be imposed even though the overall
enterprise had a net profit.
vide that the source of income from the sale of goods is where a contract of sale is concluded, and
which imposes its income tax on all income with a source in its country. Carroll, supra note 7, at
700.
74 The League of Nations' first model convention established the precedent that an enterprise
carrying on activities in a country solely through an independent agent should "not be held to [have]
a permanent establishment in that country." Bilateral Convention, supra note 16, art. 5, at 11. This
concept customarily is still included in treaties today. See Treasury Department's Proposed Model
Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, supra note 14, art. 5.
75 A. HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME, 35-45 (1933); E. SELIGMAN,
supra note 4, at 58-87.
76 Report I, supra note 9, at 15.
77 This approach was taken by most, but not all countries. For Spain, an enterprise's capacity to
pay was properly measured by the total profit of the enterprise, with "a share of this total profit
[being] attributed to the branches in Spain in accordance with their estimated relative economic
importance to the enterprise as a whole." 5 Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, League of
Nations Doc. C.425(c) M.217(c) 1933 II A, at 15 (1933). In addition, fractional apportionment was
used in limited circumstances under the laws of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. 1 Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, supra note 51, at 30-33.
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Early model conventions reflected the view that it would be easy to
determine whether and to what extent a permanent establishment had a
gain or loss by referring to the transnational enterprise's books and
records, if the books reflected separate accounting for the permanent es-
tablishment.78 Such records were usually kept for the enterprise's own
business purposes, and early model conventions deemed it appropriate
for the taxing authorities to accept them.79 Separate accounting was jus-
tified further in the international context by differences in language and
currencies which served as economic boundaries making separate treat-
ment reasonable.8 °
In 1933, after the completion of a study concerning appropriate
methods for the allocation of profits," the League of Nations approved a
78 The League of Nations' first model convention implied that the enterprise's records should be
used by providing an alternative only "[iln the absence of accounts showing [its] income separately
and in proper form." Bilateral Convention art. 5, supra note 16, at 11. A later study noted that
"[t]he normal procedure in Germany, Great Britain and the United States [was] to tax a branch of a
foreign enterprise on the basis of its own accounts, provided they [were] satisfactory or [could] be
properly adjusted." I Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, supra note 51, at 21.
79 Gerstenberg, Allocation of Business Income, 24 NA'L TAX ASS'N 301, 303 (1931).
80 The National Tax Association, concluding that separate accounting was "best for interna-
tional taxation," reasoned as follows:
I. Even where foreign undertakings are branches and not independent companies-in-
dependent companies are generally considered to be the prevailing system of organization for
American international businesses--such branches, in practice, are treated from an accounting
and administrative standpoint as separate companies.
2. The profit of the branches or establishments should be based on independent account-
ing to reflect the true financial results of the operation of each particular branch or establish-
ment. Thus, a separate system of accounting for taxation conforms to the most appropriate
method of keeping accounts for the business itself.
3. Separate systems of accounts for each branch or establishment reflect more truly the
operating conditions of the branches, the efficiency of their management and like matters, than
does any method of apportionment. Much of the complaint against double taxation would be
obviated if reports for tax purposes could be taken directly from the accounts of the company
constructed on a system intended primarily to contribute to the proper administration of the
business.
4. By keeping the accounts separately, there is no necessity for transfers of currencies or
for translations of accounting terms; the accounts for each country are kept in the language and
in the currency of that country.
5. Inspections by tax officials are facilitated if the basis of the return is the local branch
books.
6. The accuracy of the result is less subject to error.
7. Because of variations in rates of taxation among the independent sovereigns concerned
in any given case, and because political and economic conditions vary from time to time, caus-
ing profits to vary irrespective of changes in investment or in gross sales or in any other item on
which an artificial allocation of net income could be made, the only fair way of paying tax to a
country in proportion to the net income derived from the country is on the basis of separate
accounting.
Id.
81 The survey, conducted by Mitchell B. Carroll, reviewed the tax systems of over twenty coun-
tries and the states of Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin. The report was published in five
volumes: 1-5 Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, League of Nations Doe. C.73 M.38
1932 II A (1932); C.425 M.217 1933 II A (1933); C.425(a) M.217(a) 1933 II A (1933); C.425(b)
M.217(b) 1933 H A (1933); and C.425(c) M.217(c) 1933 II A (1933).
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draft convention dealing specifically with the issue.82 The convention
endorsed the fundamental concepts of treating permanent establishments
as independent taxable enterprises, and of determining an establishment's
tax base by separate accounting. 83 The convention provided three alter-
native drafts, recognizing that a transnational enterprise might not keep
its own books in a manner properly reflecting the independent separate
entity treatment of permanent establishments.8 4
First, in order to enforce the separate entity approach, the conven-
tion authorized taxing authorities to change the treatment of items in the
enterprise's books "to correct errors or omissions, or to re-establish the
prices or remunerations entered in the books at the value which would
prevail between independent persons dealing at arm's length."8" The
Convention preferred applying the arm's length standard to correct an
enterprise's books, because the standard adhered to the separate entity
treatment of permanent establishments. If the taxing authorities deter-
mined, however, that reconstruction of an enterprise's books by the
arm's length approach was "impossible in practice,"86 the Convention
provided two alternatives: an empirical method, and fractional
apportionment.
82 Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of Business Income between States for the Pur-
poses of Taxation, reprinted in Fiscal Report, supra note 44, at 3-6. This draft dealt generally with
industrial and commercial enterprises, and included specific treatment of banking and financial
enterprises.
83 If an enterprise with its fiscal domicile in one contracting state has permanent establish-
ments in other contracting states, there shall be attributed to each permanent establishment the
net business income which it might be expected to derive if it were an independent enterprise
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions. Such net income
will, in principle, be determined on the basis of the separate accounts pertaining to such
establishment.
Id. art. 3, at 4.
84 The Commentary provided by the drafters indicated that "[i]f the taxpayer produce[d], in
respect of that establishment, separate accounts in proper form which show[ed] its relations with the
international enterprise to be normal and adequately refiect[ed] them, the fiscal authorities [would]
take those accounts as a basis for the assessment." Id. Commentary to art. 3, at 6.
85 Id. art. 3, at 4. This provision dealt with a transnational enterprise with permanent establish-
ments in more than one contracting state. Another article dealt with the same problem of the poten-
tial for transfer pricing manipulation in the context of transactions between economically related
taxpayers which were not permanent establishments of a larger enterprise:
When an enterprise of one contracting State has a dominant participation in the manage-
ment of capital of an enterprise of another contracting State, or when both enterprises are
owned or controlled by the same interests, and as a result of such situation there exists, in their
commercial or financial relations, conditions different from those which would have been made
between independent enterprises, any item of profit or loss which should normally have ap-
peared in the accounts of one enterprise, but which has been, in this manner, diverted to the
other enterprise, shall be entered in the accounts of such former enterprise, subject to the rights
of appeal allowed under the law of the State of such enterprise.
Id. art. 5, at 5.
86 Id. Commentary to art. 3, at 6.
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An empirical method for determining the tax base of a permanent
establishment simply looked to gross sales, or inventory turnover, and
allotted a percentage of the figure as taxable income. The percentage was
determined by the nature of the business and comparisons with similar
enterprises operating in the same country." Empirical methods were
inherently arbitrary, however, and therefore seldomly used. 8
If the separate accounting and empirical approaches were "found to
be inapplicable," the convention authorized a fractional apportionment
method as follows:
[T]he net business income of the permanent establishment [could] be deter-
mined by a computation based on the total income derived by the enterprise
from the activities in which such establishment ha[d] participated. This
determination [was] made by applying to the total income coefficients based
on a comparison of gross receipts, assets, number of hours worked or other
appropriate factors, provided such factors [were] so selected as to ensure
results approaching as closely as possible to those which would be reflected
by a separate accounting. 89
The separate accounting and empirical approaches proceed from a
geographical perspective; viz., income can be given a geographical source
by looking to the location where income producing activities took place.
The fractional apportionment approach, by contrast, is based upon an
economic perspective; all the activities of an enterprise contribute some-
what to its overall profit or loss, thus the tax base should be measured by
net income, wherever earned.90 If the theoretical foundation for the ex-
ercise of tax jurisdiction is that only income producing activities occur-
ring within a country are taxable, with the tax base consisting solely of
the profits generated by those activities, separate accounting rather than
fractional apportionment is appropriate. 91 Nonetheless, the 1933 model
87 Id. art. 3, at 4.
88 Gerstenberg, supra note 79, at 302, 306. Empirical methods were also noted as "sometimes
unfair because they ignore the effect of circumstances peculiar to the foreign enterprise." I Taxation
of Foreign and National Enterprises, League of Nations Doc. C.73 M.38 1932 II A at 54 (1932).
89 Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of Business Income between States for the Pur-
poses of Taxation, art. 3, supra note 82, at 4.
90 G. HARLEY, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF THE INCOME TAX BASE OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRIsE 8-11 (1981). The 1933 study of the methods of allocating taxable income noted:
When the problem of taxing a foreign enterprise is viewed from the general principle that a
State has jurisdiction only over persons within, property situated within, or transactions effected
within its territory, it is obvious that, if the taxpayer resides in a foreign country, the State's
jurisdiction over its income should be restricted to income from property or other source within
its territory. The principle of permitting only the country of fiscal domicile to tax the total net
income of the taxpayer is so generally accepted that it would appear inconsistent to incorporate
in the regime a provision permitting any country in which the enterprise has a branch establish-
ment to take jurisdiction over the total net income in order to determine what part thereof
might be attributable to the local establishment.
4 Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, supra note 81, at 187-88.
91 5 Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, supra note 81, at 8.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:562(1984)
convention recognized that separate accounting, while being theoretically
sound, might be impractical or imperfect in operation. The problem
with separate accounting is in dealing with transactions between a per-
manent establishment and other operations of an overall enterprise.
Such transactions might involve transferring goods or providing services,
and the problem is in establishing the "transfer pricing" at which such
transactions take place.92 For example, an enterprise might purchase
goods in country A and sell the goods at retail in country B through a
branch office constituting a permanent establishment. In computing the
profits of the permanent establishment as a separate entity which Coun-
try B could tax, the nominal "transfer price" it paid for the goods must
be determined. This situation permits the enterprise to manipulate its
profits if the taxing authorities look to the enterprise's books and records
as the source of the transfer price. The reason is that as the transfer price
is increased, so too is the portion of the total profit attributable to the
parent. Likewise, a lower transfer price shifts more of the overall profit
to the branch office. If, in the above example, the enterprise purchase of
the goods in Country A at a cost of $50, and sold the goods in Country B
for $80, $10 of the profit would be attributed to Country A if the transfer
price was $60, but $25 would be attributed to Country A if the transfer
price is set at $75.
Because enterprises can easily manipulate transfer prices, most
countries, and many tax treaties employing the separate accounting ap-
proach, impose an "arm's length" standard for measuring intra-enter-
prise transactions. The transfer price in the previous example for tax
purposes must be the same price the enterprise would charge an unre-
lated purchaser in an otherwise identical transaction, assuming that the
two parties were dealing at arm's length. In 1933, the arm's length stan-
dard for allocating the income among the various components of a trans-
national enterprise was first included in a model convention.9 3 In 1921,
Congress amended the internal revenue laws of the United States to au-
thorize taxing authorities to "consolidate the accounts of. . .related
trades and businesses [if necessary] for the purpose of making an accu-
92 For a discussion of various theories of transfer pricing, see S. PLASSCHAERT, TRANSFER PRIC-
ING AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1979); Lamont, Multinational Enterprise, Transfer
Pricing, and the 482 Mess, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 383, 389-93 (1975). The magnitude of the
problem is reflected by a recent study which indicated that during the 1970's for all exports roughly
50% from the United States, 30% from the United Kingdom, 29% of Swedish exports and 59%
from Canada represented intra-group transactions, and, hence, transfer pricing. Messere, OECD:
Report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, 1979 INTERTAX, at 288 n.1.
93 Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of Business Income Between States for the Pur-
poses of Taxation, art. 3, supra note 81, at 4.
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rate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deductions,
or capital between or among [the] related trades or businesses. ' '94 The
statute did not specify any particular method for making the authorized
adjustments. In 1934, the United States followed the League of Nations'
example in international transactions by promulgating regulations adopt-
ing the arm's length standard.95 In 1962, the House of Representatives
approved legislation which would have deviated from the arm's length
approach in certain circumstances, but the bill failed to pass the Senate.
9 6
In 1968, Congress amended the regulations, reinforcing the arm's length
approach and providing examples of how it should apply in various fac-
tual circumstances.9 7
There are two problems with the hypothetical arm's length stan-
dard. First, the determination of a transfer price under the standard is
often truly hypothetical because comparable actual transactions rarely
exist. A recent study of how the Internal Revenue Service applies the
standard found that only three percent of the recommended adjustments
were based on actual comparable arm's length prices.9 8 This result may
be attributable to many factors, including, the nature of the business,
goods or services involved, or the quantity of goods the enterprise has
transferred. 99 Even if an enterprise treats each of its foreign permanent
establishments as separate entities on its books, and supplies transfer
prices among them for internal purposes, the potential remains great for
manipulating the geographical source of income by adjusting the transfer
94 Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, see. 240(d), 42 Stat. 227, 260. This statute was modified in
1928, Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, sec. 45, 45 Stat. 791, 806, and appears today, substantially
unchanged, as I.R.C. § 482 (1985). See 7 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON,
§ 38.61.
95 Comptroller General, IRS Could Better Protect U.S. Tax Interests in Determining the In-
come of Multinational Corporations, Rep. No. GGD-81-81 at 2-3 (Sept. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Comptroller Report].
96 H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 6 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 537. The legislation
pertained to sales of tangile personal property between U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiar-
ies-the classic situation for transfer pricing manipulation. The bill authorized an apportionment
formula, rather than an arm's length review of transfer prices. Comment, Multinational Corpora-
tions and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1202, 1211-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Multinational Corporations].
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1, -2 as amended by T.D. 6952, reprinted in 1968-1 C.B. 218. See Jenks,
Treasury Regulations Under Section 482, 23 TAX LAW. 279 (1970); Multinational Corporations,
supra note 96, at 1212.
98 Comptroller Report, supra note 95, at 27. See also R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR
USE BY UNtrrED STATES TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEW 129-32 (1981); Bums, How IRS Applies the
Intercompany Pricing Rules of Section 482: A Corporate Survey, 52 J. TAX'N 308 (1980); Fuller,
Problems in Applying the 482 Intercompany Pricing Regs. Accentuated by DuPont Case, 52 J. TAX'N
10 (1980).
99 Abrutyn, The Quest for Comparables in Section 482 Cases, 2 INT'L TAX J. 318 (1976).
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prices. The incentive to set transfer prices for favorable tax consequences
is even greater when the tax rates of the countries involved differ substan-
tially. This is especially true when a country imposes little or no tax, Le.,
a tax haven. In the example above, an enterprise might create a perma-
nent establishment in a tax haven country, country C. Instead of trans-
ferring the goods directly from country A to the permanent
establishment in country B, the goods could be routed through the per-
manent establishment in country C. If the goods purchased for $50 in
country A are transferred at a transfer price of $50 to the permanent
establishment in country C, no gain is attributable to country A. The
goods could then be transferred to the permanent establishment in coun-
try B at a transfer price of $80. If the goods are ultimately sold to the
consumer in country B for $80, no gain is attributed to country B; the
entire profit of $30 would be attributed to, and be taxable (although not
necessarily taxed) by country C.' °°
The second problem with the hypothetical arm's length approach is
that each of the two countries having jurisdiction to tax might determine
different transfer prices for the same transaction. If there is no mecha-
nism for coordination, double taxation may result. In the original exam-
ple, the tax authorities of country A might determine that the proper
transfer price to the permanent establishment in country B was $70, so
that when the goods are sold at retail for $80, $20 would be taxable by
country A. The remaining $10 would be attributable to the permanent
establishment in country B and taxable there. Country B's taxing au-
thorities, however, might determine the proper transfer price from coun-
try A to be only $65. If so, $15 of the total profit would be taxable by
country B, and $15 by country A. If both determinations governed, the
two countries would tax the enterprise on a total of $35, even though the
enterprise's actual profits were only $30. Because of this potential for
double taxation, most modern bilateral tax conventions provide for coor-
dinating redetermination of transfer prices and include some type of
mechanism to resolve conflicts.' 0 '
The Internal Revenue Service may be precipitating an additional
problem by its redetermination of transfer prices. In the United States,
the unilateral approach to ameliorating double taxation, whether as a
consequence of the redetermination of transfer prices or otherwise, is the
100 The figures used in the example are a blatent illustration of the "pig theory" in operation. In
actual practice, some of the overall profit would probably have been left attributable to countries A
and B.
101 See, e.g., Treasury Department's Proposed Model Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, supra
note 14, art. 9.
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foreign tax credit.1" 2  In general, income of a United States person
10 3
which has a foreign source and has been subject to foreign income tax
may nonetheless also be taxed by the United States."° The Internal Rev-
enue Service will permit a credit against the United States income tax
liability, in the amount of the foreign taxes paid, limited by a fraction in
which the numerator is the taxpayer's foreign source taxable income and
the denominator is the taxpayer's worldwide taxable income.0 5 If the
Internal Revenue Service redetermines a transfer price, attributing more
income to the United States operations, and less to foreign sources, the
above fraction becomes smaller, resulting in less of the foreign tax paid
being creditable. The foreign country, on the other hand, might not have
a tax treaty with the United States. The country might not agree with
the redetermination made by the Internal Revenue Service, with the re-
sult that more than 100% of the enterprise's income might be subject to
taxation.
10 6
The United States and the OECD are closely scrutinizing transfer
prices due to the problems inherent with the practical application of the
arm's length standard to transfer pricing. In 1981, the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States issued a report concluding that "the theory on
which [the arm's length approach] rests no longer corresponds to the
realities of intercorporate transactions."' 1 7  The report recommended
that consideration be given to reformulating section 482 regulations to
permit formula apportionment as an alternative to the separate-account-
102 I.R.C. § 901 (1985). For a thorough discussion of the foreign tax credit, see P.
POSTLEWAITE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 81-126 (1980).
103 A "United States person" is defined for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code as "(A) a
citizen or resident of the United States, (B) a domestic partnership, (C) a domestic corporation, and
(D) any estate or trust (other than a foreign estate or foreign trust, within the meaning of section
7701(a)(31))." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (1985).
104 Gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived. ... I.R.C. § 61 (1985).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b).
105 I.R.C. § 904 (1985).
106 For example, a domestic corporation might report to the taxing authorities of both the U.S.
and country X that it had $200 of taxable income, of which $100 was from country X. Based on
those figures, it might pay $30 of income tax to country X. The limiting foreign tax credit fraction
under I.R.C. § 904(a) would be 100/200, or 50%. If the U.S. makes an adjustment under I.R.C.
§ 482 with the effect of shifting the source of $20 of taxable income from country X to the U.S. (now
$120 U.S. source and $80 sourced in country X), it might have two effects on the taxpayer. First, the
full $30 of tax paid to country X might not be considered a creditable foreign income tax payment.
Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5). Second, the limiting fraction under I.R.C. § 904(a) would drop to 80/
200, or 40%. The $20 of taxable income which was recharacterized as U.S. source would have been
taxed both by country X and by the U.S., without the benefit of an offsetting credit for foreign
income tax paid.
107 Comptroller Report, supra note 95, at 27.
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ing/arm's-length approach.10 The Commissioner of the Internal Reve-
nue, however, brushed aside this recommendation of the report,
suggesting that the United States is in good company with the O.E.C.D.
in retaining the arm's length standard.1"9
In Europe, the OECD studied the problems of transfer pricing, and
issued a report in 1979.110 Because the arm's length approach is so
deeply embedded in the OECD Model Tax Conventions, the report did
not consider alternatives; its objective being "to set out as far as possible
the considerations to be taken into account and to describe, where possi-
ble, generally agreed practices in determining transfer prices for tax pur-
poses."'' The report did note in passing, however, its awareness of
proposals for formulary apportionment, but the report rejected this
method as arbitrary and unworkable. The report deemed the method to
be arbitrary because it disregarded both market conditions, and an enter-
prise's circumstances and allocation of resources.'1 2 The report believed
that formulary apportionment was unworkable in practice, because tax-
ing authorities, especially of a foreign country, would not have access to
information concerning the world-wide activities of a transnational
enterprise. 
113
IV. STATE TAX JURISDICTION AND DIVISION OF MULTISTATE
ENTERPRISES' BUSINESS INCOME
A. Early History
State imposed income taxes date from the 1840's, when six states
turned to them as a source of revenue.114 Some twenty years later, dur-
ing the Civil War period, the pressures of financing the war caused six
108 Id. at 53.
109 Id. at 83.
110 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises
(1979) [hereinafter cited as OECD Report]. For a summary of the report and a discussion of some
of the more important issues involved, see Messere, supra note 92. A briefer summary is in Fuller,
supra note 98, at 12.
111 OECD Report, supra note 110, at 9.
112 Id. at 14-15. The report discusses formulary apportionment and other alternatives to the
arm's length approach under the collective heading, "Global Methods."
113 Id. In addition, the different accounting systems and legal requirements of various countries
were believed to present further problems.
114 The six states were, in order of adoption, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Alabama, Florida
and North Carolina. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R.
REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 n.2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 REPORT ON STATE
TAXATION]. This Report is popularly referred to as the Willis Report because Willis was the chair-
man of the special subcommittee on state taxation.
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additional statesI15 and the federal government to adopt income taxes. 16
Following the Civil War, enthusiasm for income taxation waned,117 but
in 1894, the federal government again enacted an income tax, modeled
after that of the Civil War period.' 18 The court in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.,119 interpreted this legislation as imposing a direct tax
upon property and held it to be unconstitutional because the tax was not
required to be apportioned by population.
In 1909, Congress took two steps in an attempt to circumvent the
decision in Pollock. First, Congress submitted a joint resolution calling
for an amendment to the Constitution authorizing federal taxes to be
imposed on income without apportionment. 120 Second, Congress im-
posed a federal excise tax, measured by net income, on entities doing
business in a corporate form. 12 1 The states ratified the Sixteenth Amend-
ment in February, 1913, and the Supreme Court upheld the corporate
tax as not requiring apportionment, because it was interpreted to be an
indirect excise tax on the privilege of doing business in a corporate capac-
ity, not an income tax.
122
The dichotomy between direct income and indirect excise taxes was
important for state taxes as well, because many state constitutions pro-
hibited direct taxes. 123 With public expenditures increasing, and tradi-
tional revenue sources becoming less attractive and unable to provide
sufficient revenues, income taxes became increasingly popular. However,
state constitutional prohibitions against direct taxes presented the states
115 The six states were Georgia, Missouri, Texas, Louisiana, West Virginia and Kentucky. Id at
100 n.3.
116 Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, §§ 49-51, 12 Stat. 292, 309-11 (repealed 1862). Before any
taxes were collected under this Act, it was repealed and replaced by an 1862 Act. Act of July 1,
1862, ch. 119, §§ 89-93, 12 Stat. 432, 473-75 (repealed 1864); See Bennett v. Hunter, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 326, 333 (1869). Between 1862 and 1872, two additional federal income tax statutes were
passed. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116-23, 13 Stat. 223, 281-85 (repealed 1870); Act of July
14, 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256 (repealed 1872).
117 T. FROST, FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW 1 (1913) (federal income tax); 1964 REPORT ON
STATE TAXAmTON, supra note 114, at 100 (state income tax).
118 Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 509, 553-60.
119 157 U.S. 429, 583, reh'g 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). The Pollock holding came as a surprise
because earlier decisions were believed to have established precedent for finding income taxes to be
indirect taxes, not requiring apportionment. Eg., Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586 (1880); Hylton v.
U.S., 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). Lower courts had found the Civil War income taxes constitutional.
Eg., Clarke v. Sickel, 5 F. Cas. 981 (E.D. Pa.) (No. 2,862). See also Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R.
Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
120 S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 36 Stat. 184 (1909).
121 Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17 (repealed 1913). President Taft had
advocated both the constitutional amendment and the enactment of a corporate excise tax. 44
CONG. REc. 3344-45 (1909).
122 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1910).
123 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 100-01.
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with the same alternatives earlier faced by the federal government, either
amend their constitutions to allow direct income taxes, or enact a form of
indirect exise tax measured by income. 24 In 1911, Wisconsin enacted
what is considered to be the first modern state income tax, imposed at
graduated rates on personal and corporate income. 12 5  Other states
quickly followed suit, imposing taxes on corporations, either as direct
taxes on income, or as indirect excise or franchise taxes measured by
income, until by the early 1930's a majority of states imposed such
taxes. 1
26
B. Federal Constitutional Restrictions on State Corporate Income
Taxes
Like sovereign nations, states have inherent sovereign powers, in-
cluding the power to tax. However, states have agreed to restrictions on
their powers by ratifying the U.S. Constitution,12 7 and it is the Due Pro-
cess and the Commerce Clauses which are of paramount importance. 
12
1. Due Process Clause
"In determining [state] tax liability, the threshold question for every
business which crosses state lines is that of jurisdiction."' 129  A state's
jurisdiction extends to persons and subjects with some degree of connec-
tion or involvement with the state.13° The issue is one of degree, not
kind-how much connection with a state is needed to meet the federal
constitutional test that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty,
124 Id.
125 The Territory of Hawaii had enacted an income tax imposed on corporations in 1901. The tax
was imposed at a flat rate of 2% on personal and corporate net income, patterned after the 1894
federal legislation which had been found unconstitutional, but it was not until Wisconsin's 1911
legislation that state income taxes became popular. Id.
126 By 1920, Connecticut, Montana, New York and Massachusetts enacted franchise taxes mea-
sured by net income, while Mississippi, Virginia, Missouri and North Dakota joined Wisconsin and
Hawaii imposing direct income taxes. Id. at 103. As of December 31, 1981, 45 states imposed taxes
on or measured by corporate net income. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, Key Issues Affect-
ing State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving Rep. No. 1, GGD-82-38,
53, 59-67 (July 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
127 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 50 (1920).
128 Other federal constitutional provisions have played a lesser role. See, eg., Pensacola Tel. Co.
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1887) (Privileges and Immunities Clause); Almy v.
California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1860); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463
U.S. 159 (1983) (Foreign Commerce Clause).
129 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 594.
130 See Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 596 (1854).
584
Approaches to Taxing Business Income
6:562(1984)
or property, without due process of law."' 31
State jurisdiction in matters of taxation involves a mixture of in per-
sonam and in rem deliberations. 132 The Supreme Court held at an early
date that states have plenary power to tax residents and domestic corpo-
rations on income derived outside the state, 3 3 so long as the tax is not
"palpably arbitrary or unreasonable."' 134 The rationale for such expan-
sive power was that with respect to its residents, a state provides protec-
tion and privileges, including the right to receive and enjoy income. 135 In
New York v. Graves, the Supreme Court held that the State of New York
could tax a resident on income derived exclusively from sources located
outside the state. 136  The fact of domicile itself affords a basis for tax
jurisdiction, and the enjoyment of privileges of residency and protection
of state laws require residents to share the costs of government. "Taxes
are what we pay for civilized society."'
137
Nonresident individuals and foreign corporations may be subject to
state income taxation, but the issue is where the jurisdictional line should
be drawn. 13  In Shaffer v. Carter,139 and Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 4 companion cases decided in 1920, the Supreme Court upheld a
state tax on income derived from a business or an occupation which a
nonresident within the taxing state engaged in.'4 ' The Court was explicit
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Corporations, both foreign and domestic are protected by this
amendment. Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 555 (1923). The
application of the Due Process Clause to issues of state taxation of interstate commerce itself has had
a questioned history. It was not until 35 years after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that a
state tax was struck down on Due Process grounds. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903). However, the Court did not give any explanation for resting commerce
considerations upon Due Process reasoning. Eg., Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199
U.S. 194, 211 (1905); Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341
(1905). Notwithstanding the uncertain genesis, however, the Due Process Clause has since com-
peted with the Commerce Clause over protection of interstate commerce from state taxation. Cen-
tral R.R. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 619-23 (1962) (Black, J., concurring).
132 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 49 (1920); State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
300, 319 (1872).
133 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 498 (1879). See State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 319 (1872).
134 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, 279-80 (1932).
135 Id. at 281.
136 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
137 Id. at 313 (quoting Compaflia General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938).
138 The issues of who is a resident or a nonresident, and what is a domestic corporation or a
foreign corporation give rise to factual distinctions. See Arredoiido v. Brockette, 648 F.2d 425, 431
(5th Cir. 1981) (residence has many meanings in the law, largely determined by statutory context).
139 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
140 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
141 Schaffer, 252 U.S. at 53-56.
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that the state tax jurisdiction was not in personam, but was based on the
rights granted to the nonresident to carry on business within the state,
and thus be provied with state protections.142 The tax could be levied "as
a necessary consequence" of a state's sovereign power in such circum-
stances.'43 Shaffer involved a nonresident individual operating an exten-
sive oil and gas business in the taxing state while Yale & Towne involved
a foreign corporation conducting an ongoing business with many em-
ployees resident in the taxing state. After these decisions, questions con-
tinued to arise in various factual situations as to whether a state could tax
the income of nonresidents with fewer contacts with the state.
Over the years, courts announced various tests in attempting to de-
marcate the jurisdictional boundary. Short-hand labels such as "taxable
event" and "business situs" evinced a type of rational process in deci-
sions, but in operation their application proved merely conclusory. In
1940, the Supreme Court set forth a new standard. Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 44 dealt with a tax on a Delaware corporation, whose princi-
pal offices and all major stockholder and administrative proceedings were
located outside Wisconsin, but which did substantial business in Wiscon-
sin. The Court upheld the tax, reasoning that constitutional jurisdic-
tional "nexus" is based on the quality of the relationship existing between
the nonresident and the state. A state's power to tax depends upon the
state's granting of opportunities, protections, and benefits to the nonresi-
dent. The simple Due Process standard is "whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return."'
145
In 1959, the Supreme Court considered five cases involving state net
income taxes imposed on interstate business activities. 146 Of these, two
were consolidated for hearing and full opinion in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings, Inc. 147 In Northwestern States, an Iowa corporation manufac-
142 Id at 53.
143 Id. at 52.
144 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
145 Id. at 444. Later the Court gave a different phrasing of the Due Process standard, requiring
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transac-
tion it seeks to tax." Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). But the change
in phrasing is not a difference in substance. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
sota, 358 U.S. 450, 464-65 (1959).
146 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. 358 U.S. 450, 464-65; Williams v. Stockhan
Valves & Fittings, Inc., (argued together) 358 U.S. 450, 464-65 (1959); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 359 U.S. 28 (1959), dismissing appeal from and denying cert to 234
La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958); E.T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co. v. Currie, 359 U.S. 28 (1959), afg per
curiam 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 359 U.S. 984
(1959), denying cert to 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958).
147 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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tured and sold cement at a plant located in Iowa. In Minnesota, the
corporation regularly and systematically solicited orders for the sale of
its products through eligible dealers, however, all orders were subject to
acceptance, filling and delivery at the Iowa plant. As part of its opera-
tions, the corporation leased an office in Minnesota which a "district
manager" supervised and the corporation hired two employee salesmen
and a secretary to work at the office. The corporation had no bank ac-
counts, real property, or warehouse of inventory in Minnesota. 148
In Stockham Valves & Fittings Georgia imposed income tax on a
Delaware corporation which had its principal office and manufacturing
plant in Alabama. The corporation sold its manufactured products in
Georgia through established local dealers. The Corporation maintained
in Atlanta a sales-service office, serving five states. One commissioned
salesman who solicited orders in Georgia, and a salaried secretary
worked in the Atlanta office. Other than office supplies and equipment,
the corporation had no other property, bank accounts or merchandise in
Georgia. The sales-service office in Atlanta forwarded orders for goods
solicited in Georgia to the home office for acceptance, and the taxpayer
shipped goods directly from the Birmingham plant to customers in
Georgia.149
Notwithstanding the taxpayer's Due Process arguments, the Court
upheld the taxes in both cases. The Court applied the standard from J. C.
Penney, finding that the "substantial income producing activity" by both
corporations established the minimum connection or "nexus" with the
taxing state to conclude that the states had given something "for which it
[could] ask return." 150
The second aspect of Due Process considerations regarding state in-
come taxes imposed on multistate business enterprises is that there must
be a rational relationship between the in-state activities of the .enterprise
and the income which the state taxed. 15' Generally, a state may not im-
pose a tax on income earned outside the state by a nonresident.152 The
tax base, taxable income, of a nonresident, however, may include out-of-
state income, if the tax base is "fairly apportioned among the States for
tax purposes by [a formula] utilizing in-State aspects of interstate af-
fairs." '153 If the method of apportioning combined in-state and out-of-
148 Id. at 453-55.
149 Id. at 455-56.
150 Id. at 464-65.
151 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,436-37 (1980); Morrman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,
437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978).
152 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
153 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 358 U.S. at 460 (1959).
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state income results in combined income being "fairly apportioned." the
"rational relationship" Due Process requirement will be satisfied.154
2. Commerce Clause
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States . ... "I5 Early Supreme Court
decisions gave the Commerce Clause a restrictive interpretation in the
context of a state's power to tax an enterprise engaged in interstate com-
merce. In the Case of the State Freight Tax,l"6 the Court held that a
state tax imposed on an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce would
constitute a burden on interstate commerce, and because Congress had
not authorized the tax, it was invalid.
The belief that a state could not impose a tax on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce without express authorization by the
Congress hardened to the view that a state could not levy a general
franchise tax, imposed on domestic and foreign corporations alike, in a
nondiscriminatory fashion." 7 The Court, however, was willing to draw
a distinction between taxes on interstate commerce, and taxes merely af-
fecting interstate commerce.158 Under this distinction, the Court upheld
ad valorem taxes that states imposed on property owned by enterprises
engaged in interstate commerce. 59 Similarly, the Court upheld a nondis-
criminatory tax on net income derived from interstate commerce under
the theory that the tax was "but a method of distributing the cost of
government, like a tax upon property. . . [and thus]. . . it constitutes
one of the ordinary and general burdens of government, from which per-
sons and corporations otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the states
are not exempted by the Federal Constitution because they happen to be
engaged in commerce among the states."'"
154 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980). The Supreme Court has
not prescribed any single apportionment formula or method, but has sanctioned various formulas as
applied to the facts of specific cases. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113
(1920); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); and Butler Bros. v. McCol-
gan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
156 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); See Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Business,
4 TAX L. REV. 95 (1948); Hellerstein & Hennefield, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54
HARv. L. REv. 949 (1941); and J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXAo
TION, 237-390 (4th ed. 1978).
157 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 246 U.S. 147 (1918); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Commonwealth, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (taxes which discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce were also held invalid).
158 The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206 (1873).
159 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894).
160 United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918).
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The Court began to view the Commerce Clause restrictions on state
taxing power in a different light by the late 1930's. The Court discarded
the view that "[i]nterstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though
the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that
which is carried on solely within the state."16 ' Instead, the test of
whether a state tax violated the Commerce Clause by imposing a "bur-
den" on interstate commerce depended upon whether the tax made inter-
state commerce potentially subject to multiple taxation.' 62 If a tax was
properly apportioned to the in-state activities of a multistate enterprise,
then the court would not strike it down.
163
By 1951, the composition of the Supreme Court had changed and so
had its interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor,16' involved Connecticut's franchise tax, which the state
imposed on both domestic and foreign corporations for the privilege of
doing business within the state. Even though the tax did not discrimi-
nate against interstate activities 16 and even though the tax was appor-
tioned to the enterprise's activities within the state, 6 6 the Court held that
the tax was invalid as applied to a foreign corporation engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce. Because the incidence of the tax, as ap-
plied to the Spector Motor Service company, was on the privilege of
engaging in exclusively interstate commerce, it was invalid under the
Commerce Clause. 167 If income derived from exclusively interstate busi-
ness is made subject to a state tax, the state tax is unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause "no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business
done within the state."'
168
The Court soon receded from its restrictive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause which it delineated in Spector Motor Service. In 1959,
the Court rendered its landmark decision in Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 69 upholding a nondiscriminatory tax imposed
on net income. The tax base included income derived from an exclu-
sively interstate business, but net income was apportioned according to
the percentage of the taxpayer's sales, tangible property, and payroll
within Minnesota. The Court recalled the distinction between a tax
161 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887).
162 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
163 Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
164 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
165 Id. at 607.
166 Id. at 606.
167 Id. at 609-10.
168 Ird at 609.
169 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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which imposes a direct burden on interstate commerce, and a tax which
merely constitutes an indirect burden. 170 The Court distinguished the
holding in Spector Motor Service on the grounds that the incidence of
Connecticut's tax was the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce,
while the incidence of the tax in Northwestern States was activities which
took place within the taxing state. The Court upheld the tax even though
the in-state activities which gave rise to taxable income involved exclu-
sively interstate commerce.171
The United States Supreme Court in 1975 upheld Louisiana's tax on
an enterprise engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. 72 An earlier
version of the state law imposed a tax "for the privilege of carrying on or
doing business" within the state; but the state courts determined that the
tax violated the Commerce Clause, relying on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Spector Motor Service. 73 The Louisiana Legislature
reformulated its tax,' 74 to levy it on "[tihe qualification to carry on or do
business in [Louisiana] or the actual doing of business within [Louisiana]
in a corporate form."'75 This permitted the Supreme Court to conclude
that
[t]he tax cannot be said to be imposed upon appellant merely or solely for
the privilege of doing interstate business in Louisiana. It is, rather, a fairly
apportioned and nondiscriminatory means of requiring appellant to pay its
just share of the cost of state government upon which appellant necessarily
relies and by which it is furnished protection and benefits.176
In 1977 the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady finally
discarded the approach taken in Spector Motor Service.177 The state lev-
170 Id. at 459, citing United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
171 358 U.S. at 463-64. The absurdity of the formalistic approach taken by the Court in applying
the Commerce Clause during this era became apparent in two cases involving the Railway Express
Agency and Virginia's taxes involving gross receipts. In 1954, the tax was denominated a license tax
for the privilege of doing business in the state, and was held invalid as applied to an enterprise
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359
(1954). By 1959, the Virginia Legislature reformulated its tax, making it a franchise tax, laid on
intangible property of express companies, in lieu of all other intangible property taxes, but to be
measured by gross receipts, fairly apportioned to activities within the state. This levy was upheld,
although the Court took pains to sanctimoniously caution, "[t]his is not to say that a legislature may
effect a validation of a tax, otherwise unconstitutional, by merely changing its descriptive words."
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959).
172 Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
173 Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1969), cert denied, 231 So. 2d
393 (La. 1970).
174 The Louisiana Legislature no doubt had taken its cue from the Virginia Legislature's success-
ful response to Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954). See supra note 170.
175 421 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 114.
177 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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ied a tax, measured by gross receipts and fairly apportioned to the state,
"for the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business
within" Mississippi.' 78 The Court recounted that it was consistent with
the Commerce Clause for a state to tax an enterprise engaged in inter-
state commerce, if the tax is fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and
fairly related to services which the taxing state provided. Only the for-
malistic application of Spector Motor Service would cause a tax to be
struck down, even though the state could achieve the same objective by
chosing its statutory language carefully. "Under the present state of the
law, the Spector rule, as it has come to be known, has no relationship to
economic realities. Rather it stands only as a trap for the unwary drafts-
man.'1 7 9 The Court noted that there were "no real economic differ-
ences" between the two Virginia taxes which the Railway Express
Agency assailed in the 1950's,11 and that the Louisiana tax which the
Supreme Court upheld in Colonial Pipeline differed from the predecessor
tax which the state court had struck down only because the Louisiana
Legislature had "recogniz[ed] that it had run afoul of a rule of words
rather than a rule of substance. . . ."' Rather than engaging further
in sophistry, Justice Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court:
[W]e now reject the rule of Spector Motor Service, Inc v. O'Connor, that a
state tax on the "privilege of doing business" isper se unconstitutional when
it is applied to interstate commerce, and that case is overruled.
182
Although Completed Auto Transit focused on the Commerce
Clause, the Court melded Due Process concerns with those of the Com-
merce Clause in describing a tax which may be imposed on the net in-
come of a foreign corporation engaged in interstate business. A tax is
valid "when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State."
1 83
V. UNIFORMITY IN STATE TAXATION
A. General Demand for Tax Uniformity Among States
Federal constitutional restrictions on the exercise of state taxing
178 Id. at 275.
179 Id. at 279.
180 Id. at 284; see also supra note 170.
181 Id. at 286.
182 Id. at 288-89.
183 d at 279.
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power eroded with the Supreme Court granting the states broad discre-
tion in fashioning rules for determining tax base and the "fair apportion-
ment" of income. As a result, multistate business enterprises felt
increasingly defenseless and at the mercy of state legislation. Conse-
quently, the business community began to push for some uniformity in
the rules both for asserting state tax jurisdiction and for measuring the
tax base.
184
In determining the amount of income attributable to a taxing state,
two elements must be clearly distinguished. The first is the definition of
net income. Clearly, if states use disparate definitions of net income, no
uniform rule for the division of net income could guarantee equality be-
cause net income in one state might include items of gross income ex-
cluded by another state, or deductions might be allowed in one state and
disallowed in another. A uniform approach to measuring the tax base
seemed possible in the early days of state income taxes because many
states incorporated the tax base used for federal income tax purposes.
1 85
By the early 1960's, however, most states diverged to some degree from
the federal income tax definition of taxable income, favorably emphasiz-
ing local concerns. 8 6  The deviations from federal law were generally
minor, and substantial conformity with a major portion of the federal
approach remained, especially in the states which taxed the apportioned
total net income of unitary businesses.1 87 Consequently, multistate busi-
ness enterprises were more concerned with the rules for dividing income
for tax purposes.
When Wisconsin became the first state to enact a corporate income
tax in 1911, it provided three methods of dividing the income of a multi-
state enterprise: separate accounting, specific allocation, and formula ap-
portionment.'8 8 Separate accounting starts with the premise that income
from a multistate entity can be segregated so that separate net incomes
can be determined for the activities conducted within each state. 8 9 Early
state statutes favored this method, but increasing interrelationships
among subunits of large corporations made it virtually impossible to
ascribe specific items of income and deductions to any specific state, and
184 See generally Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax, 32 HARV. L. REv. 587 (1919); Beale, The Situs of
Things, 28 YALE L.J. 525 (1919); Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7 VA. L. REv. 167, 245,
429, 497 (4 pts.) (1920-21).
185 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 109.
186 Id. at 255-56.
187 Id. at 279.
188 Id. at 113; See supra notes 70-113 and accompanying text.
189 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 115.
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the method lost support. 9 °
Specific allocation and formula apportionment are generally related.
Under specific allocation, a state assigned or allocated to a particular
state certain items of income, usually derived from intangibles, for taxa-
tion, without further division. 19 ' The state divided or apportioned the
remaining net income of the enterprise among states according to a
formula. The formula may be composed of a single factor, or numerous
factors with varying weight given to each. Early state statutes often used
a single factor of sales or property, but multifactor formulas became
widespread, with the most popular being a three-factor formula based on
property, payroll and sales, with each factor being given equal weight.
Under the three-factor formula, a state combines an enterprise's intra-
state property, payroll and sales to form the numerator of a fraction, the
denominator being a combination of these same factors of the enterprise
from whatever source. The state then multiplied the fraction by the tax
base, composed of net income from all sources, to arrive at the portion of
the tax base subject to taxation by that state.
192
Because each state is free to adopt an apportionment formula which
will withstand constitutional scrutiny if it produces "fair apportion-
ment," myriad differences in apportionment formulas have arisen, and
nonuniformity in state taxation prevails. 193 Experience has shown that
states will adopt a particular formula which is in their own economic
self-interest, while the potential of multiple taxation of multistate busi-
ness enterprises encourages businesses to push for uniform rules of
apportionment. 194
190 Id.
191 Id. at 118. Although specific allocation is generally applied in conjunction with formulary
apportionment; one commentator has stated that specific allocation is really a special case of separate
accounting. W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 3.6 (1963).
192 See generally, 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 118-22.
193 Id.; Cohen, State Tax Allocation and Formulas Which Affect Management Operating Deci-
sions, 1 J. TAX'N (No. 2) 2 (1954); Silverstein, Problems of Apportionment in Taxation of Multistate
Business, 4 TAX L. REv. 207 (1949).
194 1964 REPoRT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 123 states:
The formulae presently employed by the various states for the apportionment of multi-state
income, generally speaking, were enacted by state legislatures for revenue purposes only, and
without any thought to uniformity with the laws of other states. Factors of formulae, and the
components thereof have been weighted to meet local interests peculiar to the state, and with no
interstate cooperation in view. This has resulted in many inequities, some of gross proportions.
In the enactment of apportionment laws, too much regard has been given to the need for reve-
nue, and not enough to the welfare of the taxpayer; too much to circumventing court decisions
by legislative gymnastics, and not enough to the clear intent of the Constitution.
Statement of Fred L. Cox, Director of Income Tax Unit, State of Georgia, reprinted in Industry
Critical of Uniform Act for Dividing Income Between States, Survey Shows, 36 TAXES 533, 534
(1958).
A multistate entity challenging a state apportionment formula has a heavy burden to overcome,
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B. State-Level Attempts at Uniformity
1. National Tax Association
It was not long after states first enacted income taxes that multijuris-
dictional enterprises began encountering problems of compliance and
multiple taxation. In 1916, the National Tax Association (NTA) 195 be-
gan work on a uniform model state income tax law. 196 Over the next
forty-five years, the NTA appointed no less than seven committees to
study the approaches to achieve uniformity at a state level,197 and an-
other three committees to study state-federal intergovernmental ap-
proaches.1 98 Although some of the best tax minds in the country served
on these committees, and they spent considerable time and energy in the
effort, no meaningful results were achieved. Nonetheless, the NTA activ-
ity did focus attention on the problems of lack of interstate uniformity,
and did provide some foundation for later action taken in drafting a uni-
form state law. 199
2. Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
As the NTA strived to achieve uniformity in state taxation of multi-
state business enterprises, other groups also addressed the issues.2 °° In
1953, the Governors' Conference requested the Council of State Govern-
either showing the formula is void on its face, or by clear and cogent evidence in practical operation
it is oppressive to the taxpayer. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942); Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 684, 688 (1936). See Factors that Make a Business Unitary
and thus Subject To Apportionment, 11 J. TAX'N 240 (1959).
195 The NTA, an organization of tax officials from the various states, held its first annual confer-
ence in Columbus, Ohio in 1907. Opening Proceedings, NAT'L TAx Assoc. (1909). In 1973 the
NTA merged with the Tax Institute of America, and the organization is now referred to as the
NTA-TIA. By-laws of National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America, 66 NAT'L TAX. ASs'N
xxi (1973).
196 See, Gerstenberg, Standardization and Simplification of Business Taxes: Report of Committee
of the National Tax Association, 20 NAT'L TAX ASS'N 323-24 (1927). It was suggested that the
initial NTA impetus on the subject of state taxation of multistate business started with the paper by
Professor Bullock at the 1916 National Conference. Bullock, The State Income Tax and the Classi-
fied Property Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX Assoc. 362 (1916). At the time of the 1916 conference, only five
states imposed corporate taxes relating to income. 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra, note
114, at 103.
197 The first committee was formed in 1916; the seventh committee, in 1955.
198 In 1933, the first intergovernmental committee was appointed; the third such committee was
appointed in 1953.
199 See infra notes 200-214 and accompanying text.
200 Other organizations such as the American Bar Association, the National Association of At-
torneys General, the National Association of Tax Administrators, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, and the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws had
worked towards state income tax uniformity. See A.B.A. Comm. on State and Local Taxes, Recom-
mendations, 22 TAX LAW. 1041, 1056 (1959) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Recommendations].
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ments to study the problem of uniformity," 1 and soon afterwards, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Na-
tional Conference)" 2 began preparation of proposed drafts. 2 3 In July of
1957 the National Conference approved a final draft, entitled the Uni-
form Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).204 Within a
week, the UDITPA was approved by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association.20 5
The primary objective of the UDITPA was to provide a state-level
solution to a uniform approach to the division of a multistate enterprise's
income.20 6 Under the UDITPA all income of a multistate enterprise is
initially divided into two categories, nonbusiness income and business in-
come.20 7 With respect to the former, the UDITPA identifies four types
of nonbusiness income: rents and royalties from real and tangible per-
sonal property, capital gains and losses from sales of real and personal
property, interest and dividends, and patent and copyright royalties.2 0
These four categories correspond to traditional state legislation which
requires that one hundred percent of such items be allocated to a specific
state.20 9 An exception to prevailing state laws called for income to be
allocated to the taxpayer's home state when the taxpayer was not taxable
(e.g., because of insufficient nexus with the state) in the state to which a
specific item of income would otherwise be allocated under the general
rules.2 10
UDIPTA defines business income as "income arising from transac-
tions and activities in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or busi-
201 Industry Critical of Uniform Act for Dividing Income Between States, Survey Shows, supra note
194, at 534.
202 For general information on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, see Council of State Governments: The Book of the States 14 (1956-57).
203 A tentative draft entitled "Uniform Allocation and Apportionment of Income Act" was sub-
mitted in 1956. See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State laws
and Proc., Ann. Conference Sixty-Fifth Year 89, 270 (1956); Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Cor-
porate Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Not Facit Saltum, 18 OHIO ST. L.L 84, 95 (1957).
204 See Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1958);
Lynn, New Uniform Act for Dividing Income Between States Approved, 35 TAxEs 631 (1957). The
UDITPA is currently contained in 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 391 (1978).
205 2 American Bar News 3 (1957); see generally Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act, supra note 204.
206 See generally, Lynn, supra note 204; Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax
Purposes, 35 TAxEs 747 (1957). The UDITPA was also aimed at simplifying compliance with state
tax acts. Industry Critical of Uniform Act for Dividing Income Between States, Survey Shows, supra
note 194, at 534.
207 7A Uniform Laws Annotated §§ 1(a), l(e), 4, 9 (1978).
208 Id. §§ 5, 6, 7, 8.
209 See Pierce, supra note 206, at 749.
210 7A Uniform Laws Annotated §§ 5, 6, 8 (1978).
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ness and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute inte-
gral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations." 2" In-
come which is not within the definition of business income is defined as
nonbusiness income."' l The UDITPA apportions a multistate enter-
prise's total business income by the popular formula utilizing a property
factor, a payroll factor, and a sales factor, giving equal weight to each
factor.21 UDIPTA expressly exempts three major classes of taxpayers:
individuals to the extent of personal service income, financial organiza-
tions, and public utilities.214
3. Multistate Tax Compact
In 1964, the Committee, headed by Congressman Willis, completed
its exhaustive study of state taxation of interstate commerce, and pub-
lished a report (popularly referred to as the Willis Report) containing
recommendations for limiting state taxing power.2 15 The Willis Report
paid special attention to past state-level efforts to achieve uniformity, es-
pecially those of the NTA,2 16 and the recently adopted UDITPA.217 The
Willis Report traced the efforts of the NTA, noting the gradual shift
from pure state-level approaches to some form of congressional solu-
tion.218 In addition, it noted that while the UDITPA represented the
first genuine state-level proposal, only three of the thirty-eight states im-
posing an income tax had adopted it, and only one of the three had en-
211 Id. § 1(a).
212 Id. § 1(e).
213 The property factor is a fraction, with the average value of the taxpayer's property used in the
state during the tax year in the numerator; the denominator is the average value of such property
wherever located. Id. § 10. Similar fractions are computed for the payroll factor, id § 13, and the
sales factor, id. § 15. The final apportionment fraction is the sum of the property, payroll and sales
factors divided by three. Id. § 9.
214 Id. § 2. See Pierce, supra note 206, at 748-49.
215 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114. Subsequent reports were issued in 1965.
H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
See Taylor, Willis Report on Interstate Taxation: New Laws to Make Sweeping Changes, 23 J. TAX'N
374 (1965); Taylor, House Study Findf State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Burdensome and Un-
fair, 21 J. TAX'N 120 (1964); Note, State Taxation of Interstate Business--Looking Toward Federal-
State Cooperation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1217 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cooperation.] Prior to the
Willis Report, reliable economic data for evaluating the problem of multiple taxation of multistate
business was nonexistant. Hellerstein, An Academician's View of State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce, 53 NAT'L TAX ASs'N 201, 207 (1960).
216 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 128-32. See NTA discussion supra
notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
217 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 132-33. See also UDITPA discussion
supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text.
218 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note 114, at 129-32.
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acted it verbatim.2 19 In light of this paucity of state action, the
subcommittee joined by leading advocates of state power220 vigorously
endorsed full-scale federal intervention.221  Representative Willis intro-
duced legislation in 1965 to effectuate the Willis Report's recommenda-
tions, 222 but Congress adjourned before final passage.
22 1
Sensing forthcoming federal legislation and fearing loss of local con-
trol over state taxation, numerous state tax administators began a full-
scale state-level response. 224 In January of 1966, the National Associa-
tion of State Tax Administrators Association met to formulate a strategy
to head off federal action. The Association formed a special committee
to prepare a model multistate tax statute, and on December 20, 1966, the
Committee issued the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC).22 1 The MTC be-
came effective on August 4, 1967, when the seventh state adopted it,
22 6
219 The three states were Alaska, Arkansas and Kansas, with only Kansas adopting the UDITPA
verbatim. Id. at 133.
220 The report concluded:
Fifty years ago, as the first of the states adopted the income tax, forward-looking tax men
warned of the dangers of each State taxing interstate commerce in its own way. For 50 years
State tax administrators have been discussing ways of achieving simplicity and uniformity. One
proposal after another has been formulated, discussed, revised, and in spite of the expenditure of
enormous efforts, discarded. And, today, the States appear to be as far from a solution as they
have ever been. In short, the history of 50 years of State income taxation leaves no room for
optimism that the States will be any more successful in the future than they have been in the
past.
Certainly, the problems presented are not easy problems, but they are important problems.
They are important to the States and they are important to the vitality of the American com-
mon market. Congress has a responsibility to both, and it is time for it to seek a solution.
Id. at 599.
221 F.L. Cox, leading spokesman for state and intergovernmental level solutions testified before
the subcommittee that "we have now arrived at a point that I have frequently warned the States they
would arrive at, when it would be necessary for Congress to act independently of the States." Id. at
133 (footnote omitted).
222 H.RL 11798, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (THE "INTERSTATE TAXATION ACT"), reprinted in
19 A.B.A. TAX. SECTION 11-12 (1965). For a discussion of this Act, see Bishop & Taylor, H.R.
11798: Reform or Ruin?-The Proposed Interstate Taxation Act, 29 TEX. BJ. 247, 307 (1966).
223 Cellar, The Development of a Congressional Program Dealing with State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 385, 390 (1968). Originally H.RL 11798 would have imposed a
mandatory two-factor apportionment formula, and required federal administration and adjudication
of state taxes, but the bill was amended during hearings making the formula optional and eliminating
direct federal control. Cooperation, supra note 215, at 1320.
224 For an example of the Texas response to H.R. 11798, see Resolution on No. 4, 29 TEX. B.J.
660, 662, 890 (1966); Referendum Results, 29 TEX. B.J. 890 (1966); Taylor, Multistate Tax Compact"
Texas' Exciting Answer in the Battle With Proponents of Federal Control Over State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, 30 Tax. BJ. 773 (1967).
225 MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, reproduced in State Tax Guide, All States (CCH)) 35 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT]; Cooperation, supra note 215, at 1321 n.24.
226 The first seven states in order of adoption were Kansas, Washington, Texas, New Mexico,
Illinois, Florida and Nevada. Sharpe, State Taxation of Interstate Businesses and the Multistate Tax
Compact: The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, 11 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 231, 244 n.50
(1975). The stated purposes of the MTC were to:
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and by January 13, 1970, there were nineteen member states.2 27
A chief feature of the MTC is the formation of a Multistate Tax
Commission (Commission), composed of one representative from each
member state, and charged with administering the MTC and adopting
uniform regulations and tax forms.2" 8 More importantly, the Commis-
sion is granted the authority, upon request or on its own initiative, to
conduct a consolidated audit of the records of a multistate enterprise.
2 29
Another significant feature of the MTC is the incorporation of the provi-
sions of the UDITPA. Under, the MTC, a state may utilize whatever
apportionment formula it desires, but upon application of a taxpayer, the
UDITPA approach must be employed. 30
Although the MTC represented the first comprehensive state-level
attempt to generate uniformity in state taxation, the effort failed to stave
off congressional movement towards a solution. 31 Both in 1967-68232
and in 1969233 the House passed legislation, but the Senate failed to do
SO.
2 3 4
Shortly after the creation of the MTC, movement began for Con-
gressional sanctioning of the MTC because of concern that absent Con-
gressional approval, the MTC was in violation of the Compact Clause.235
1. Facilitate proper determination of state and local tax liability of multistate taxpayers
including the equitable apportionment of tax bases and settlement of apportionment disputes;
2. Promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax systems;
3. Facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of tax returns and in other
phases of tax administration;
4. Avoid duplicative taxation.
MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, supra note 225, art. I, reprinted also in United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 795, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) afl'd 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
227 By December, 1983, there were twenty-one member states (including the District of Colum-
bia), and ten associate member states. 1983 MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N REV. 3 (1983). For a
discussion of associate membership status, see MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, 6 ANN. REP. No. 12
(1973).
228 MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, supra note 225, art. VI, §§ l(a), (f).
229 Id. art. VIII. The overall effectiveness of the consolidated audit is open to debate, with some
taxpayers contesting the Commission's authority. Krol, Taxpayers Balking at Submitting to Audits
of Multistate Tax Commission, 43 J. TAX. 364 (1975); Sharpe, supra note 226 at 245-46, nn.56-57.
See also Cappetta, Joint Audit Program of the Multistate Tax Commission, 33 INST. ON FED. TA'N
961 (1975).
230 MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT art. IV.
231 Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND.
L. REV. 335, 341 (1976).
232 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
233 H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in A.B.A. Recommendations, supra note 200,
at 1045-53.
234 Cooperation, supra note 215, at 1320 n.20. Subsequent legislative proposals have also failed to
be enacted, e.g., S.2084, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.2092, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.1245, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
235 Taylor, supra note 224, at 774. The Compact Clause provides that "[n]o State shall, without
the consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S.
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In 1972, the United States Steel Corporation filed a declaratory action
against the MTC challenging its validity.236 In February 1978, however,
the Supreme Court upheld the MTC in United States Steel Corp. v. Mul-
tistate Tax Comm'. 237
Although the laudable objective of the MTC was to achieve state-
level uniformity in state taxation of multistate enterprises, it has re-
mained elusive. Even though more than half of the states are full or
associate members of the MTC,238 the member states are free to supply
their own administrative and judicial interpretations of the provisions of
the MTC.239 The regulations which MTC authorized the Commission to
promulgate are advisory only; members may adopt, reject or amend the
regulations as they see fit.2' Without uniform interpretation of the stat-
utory allocation and apportionment provisions, uniform application and
results are not possible.
C. Federal-Level Attempts at Uniformity
L Public Law No. 86-272
Although Congress has not acted to impose uniform rules of alloca-
tion and apportionment of a multistate enterprise's income the Supreme
Court has addressed the threshold for asserting state tax jurisdiction.
During the 1950's, Supreme Court decisions, culminating with North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stock-
ham Valves & Fittings, Inc., increasingly narrowed the scope of Due
Process and Commerce Clause limitations on a state's power to tax non-
resident corporations engaged in interstate commerce. 241 The Supreme
Court upheld the taxes in both cases, holding
that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may
be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is
properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming suf-
ficient nexus to support the same. 242
Const. art. I, sec. 10, cl. 3. "Many attempts were made to obtain Congressional consent from 1966
thru 1973, but none were successful." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434
U.S. 452, 458 n.8 (1978).
236 United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid,
434 U.S. 452 (1978).
237 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
238 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
239 Interview with Eugene F. Corrigan, Executive Director, Multistate Tax Commission, in Boul-
der, Colorado (May 2, 1983).
240 MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, supra note 225, art. VII; United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 457 (1978).
241 358 U.S. 450 (1959); see discussion, text and supra notes 146-50.
242 358 U.S. at 452.
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The Court did not explore the "nexus" issue to any great extent.
The Court merely noted that substantial income had been "derived from
the taxing State's sales which are shown to be promoted by vigorous and
continuous sales campaigns run through a central office located in the
State."243 A week later, however, the Court dismissed the appeal in
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue. 44 Brown-For-
man was a Kentucky corporation engaged in the business of distilling
and packaging alcoholic beverages, and it had less contact with the tax-
ing state (Louisiana) than had the taxpayers in Northwestern States or
Stockham Valves & Fittings. The taxpayer in Brown-Forman did not
have a sales office nor did it maintain a warehouse or stock of goods in
Louisiana; its activities in the taxing state were "limited to the presence
of 'missionary men' who call upon wholesale dealers and who, on occa-
sion, accompany the salesmen of these wholesalers to assist them in ob-
taining a suitable display" or merchandise at retail outlets.24 5 Orders for
goods which the missionary men solicited from in-state wholesalers were
subject to approval by the home office in Kentucky; the manufacturer
shipped goods directly to customers from Kentucky, and customers rent
payment to the home office.246 The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld
the apportioned income tax, finding no Due Process or Commerce
Clause infirmity. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
As the constitutional restraints on state income tax jurisdiction
eroded, many small- and medium-sized enterprises engaged in interstate
business activity became concerned about the low threshold of activity
which might subject them to a state's income tax, and the attendant bur-
dens and costs of compliance. The Senate Finance Committee held hear-
ings in July, 1959, to consider proposals to limit state income tax
jurisdiction.247 Congress subsequently enacted Public Law No. 86-272
on September 14, 1959.248
Public Law No. 86-272 imposes a minimum jurisdictional threshold
which must be crossed before a state may impose an income tax on a
nonresident's income derived within the state. Such a tax may not be
imposed if the only business activities of the nonresident carried on
within the state are the solicitation of orders for the sale (by the nonresi-
dent or a prospective client or customer of the nonresident) of tangible
243 Id. at 465.
244 359 U.S. 28 (1959), dismissing appeal from 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958).
245 101 So. 2d at 70.
246 Id.
247 S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2548-49.
248 Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1976)).
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personal property, if the orders are subject to approval outside the state,
and are filled by the shipment or delivery of goods from outside the state.
Either employees or independent agents may solicit orders within this
safe harbor, and if independent agents are used, sales may be completed
within the state, and a sales office may be maintained for their use.249 If
employees of the nonresident, rather than independent contractors,
maintain the sales office, that constitutes activity which goes beyond the
mere solicitation of orders, and removes the nonresident from the safe
harbor protection of Pub. L. 86-272.250
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
constitutional validity of Pub. L. No. 86-272, although it did deny certio-
rari review of a Louisiana case in which the state Supreme Court upheld
the Act as a valid exercise of power reserved to the Congress by the Com-
merce Clause.251 The Supreme Court of Missouri,252 the Supreme Court
of Oregon,253 and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 254 have upheld the
validity of Pub. L. 86-272.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court decision in
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board 5 has precipitated
Congressional activity directed towards the determination of the tax base
of a multistate enterprise. The Supreme Court rendered the Container
Corp. decision in June, 1983, and on September 6, 1983, the Cabinet
Council on Economic Affairs voted to recommend that the President
take a public position against the worldwide unitary approach.256 On
September 23, 1983, the Secretary of the Treasury announced the forma-
tion of a working group of representatives from the Federal and state
governments and the business community to study the issues raised by
the worldwide unitary approach.257 In addition, Senator Mathias and
249 Pub. L. 86-272, Title I, § 101, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)).
250 Jantzen, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 29 (D.C. App. 1978); see also Goldberg v.
State Tax Comm'n, 618 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1981); Hartman, Solicitation and Delivery Under Public
Law 86-272: An Uncharted Course, 29 VAND. L. REv. 354 (1976).
251 International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 902 (1964).
252 State ex rel. Ciba Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo.
1964).
253 Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Or. 50, 403 P.2d 375
(1965).
254 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 420 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1966). For
an analysis of Pub. L. 86-272, its history and effects, see 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra
note 114.
255 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, (1983); see infra note 278
and accompanying text.
256 Tax Notes, Sept. 12, 1983 at 901.
257 Tax Notes, Oct. 3, 1983 at 69; see Lewin, Unitary Tax Scope Widens, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
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Representative Conable have introduced legislation to prohibit states
from using the worldwide unitary method.258
2. Case Law
The imposition of a minimum jurisdictional standard by Public Law
No. 86-272 did little to settle the problem of potential double taxation of
a multistate enterprise clearly doing business in more than one state.2 59
In such situations, the main constitutional issue is whether a state's
method of apportionment is fair.26° In the years immediately following
Northwestern States, attention was initially directed towards apportion-
ment formulas, but more recently the emphasis has shifted to considera-
tion of the tax base which is subject to apportionment.
In 1965, the Supreme Court handed down the first major decision
following Northwestern States regarding the measure of a state income
tax. In General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia (General Motors II)
the Court struck down an apportionment formula composed of the single
factor of sales, but did so on the ground that the formula, which had
been promulgated by administrative regulation, was not authorized by
statute.2 6 ' However, in dicta, the Court again sanctioned the familiar
three-factor formula.26 2
Because of General Motors IIs seeming disdain for any formula
other than the three-factor formula, and the incorporation of the
UDITPA by the MTC, most states moved to a three-factor apportion-
ment formula. By 1978, forty-four of forty-six states imposing corporate
income taxes were using the three-factor apportionment formula.263
1983, at 28, col. 1. For a discussion of the unitary business concept, see infra notes 267-79 and
accompanying text.
258 H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), sponsored by Rep. Conable, and S. 1225, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983), sponsored by Sen. Mathias.
259 Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND.
L. REv. 335, 339-40 (1976). For general criticism of Public Law No. 86-272, see Wagner & Del
Duca, Uniformity or Preferential Tax Immunity for Multi-State Firms, 48 A.B.A. J. 532 (1962).
260 See supra notes 153-82 and accompanying text.
261 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965). There was also some hesitation by the Court as to whether a sales-
factor formula adequately measured the source of income or reflected the social cost of government.
See Hellerstein, State Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 120-23
(1977).
262 380 U.S. at 559-61.
263 Brief, Amicus Curiae, Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of
Commerce at 168-69, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), reprinted in 10 Law Reprints,
Tax Series No. 10 (1977/78 Term). While this tremendous uniformity was occurring on a surface
level, however, a submovement was begun as Florida, Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin
modified their particular three-factor formulas giving double weight to the sales factor. Id. at 178.
The effect of this modification reduced taxes of local business at the expense of instate sales of foreign
business enterprises. Hellerstein, supra note 261, at 123, 132 n.98.
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Iowa continued to apportion interstate income according to a formula
using the single factor of sales, and the Court in Morrman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair"6 upheld this approach. The Court clarified its decision in General
Motors 11, stating that it had been decided purely upon statutory
grounds, and that the Court had taken no position in that case on the
constitutionality of a single sales-factor formula. Thus the Iowa statute
would be measured by traditional Due Process and Commerce Clause
standards.26 5 After examining the pre-Northwestern States line of cases,
the Court upheld the Iowa formula because the taxpayer failed to present
affirmative proof demonstrating actual multiple taxation. The strong
presumptive validity of the state statute prevailed, and in conclusion, the
Court noted that the traditional constitutional analysis would be applied
on a case-by-case basis "until Congress prescribes a different rule.)
2 66
After the Morrman decision, the Supreme Court turned its attention
to the state tax base and the concept of a unitary business. Two decisions
in early 1980 addressed the issue of "unitary business." The first, Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,267 involved Vermont's corporate in-
come tax which Vermont imposed on a foreign corporation. The state
employed the common three-factor formula, but included in the tax-
payer's apportionable tax base, dividends received from subsidiary corpo-
rations, which is normally a type of income subject to specific allocation
rather than apportionment. The Court found that the taxpayer's net-
work of divisional entities constituted a "unitary business," and thus the
dividend income could properly be included in the tax base subject to
apportionment. The nature of an item of income is not determinative; a
taxpayer must show that an item of income is attributable exclusively to
out-of-state business in order to keep it out of the apportionable tax
base.268 The corporation attempted to demonstrate that the dividend in-
264 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
265 Id. at 275, citing General Motors II, 380 U.S. at 561.
266 Id. at 275-76, 281. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Powell vehemently dissented arguing
that the Court should be mindful of the regressive effect the decision would have upon attempts at
generating state tax uniformity and should look to possible multiple taxation from the use of diverse
formulas. Id at 281-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 282-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and 283-97
(Powell, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
267 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
268 The unitary business method takes into account:
contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management,
and economies of scale. Because these factors of profitability arise from the operation of the
business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the income of the business as having
a single identifiable "source.". . . [Tihe linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income
taxation is the unitary-business principle. In accord with this principle [the taxpayer] must
show, in order to establish that its [income] is not subject to [apportionment), that the income
was earned in the course of activities unrelated to [instate business].
Id at 438-39 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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come had been earned outside the state by presenting accounting records,
but the Court rejected the evidence, holding the tax violated neither the
Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause.26
9
The second case decided in 1980, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Revenue,27 also dealt with what items of income could be in-
cluded in the tax base subject to apportionment. The focus was not on
any particular item of income, but on whether the taxpayer's total oper-
ating income could be apportioned, although only marketing activities
occurred in the state. The Court found that the taxpayer was engaged in
a unitary business, notwithstanding the fact the taxpayer's books re-
flected "functional," as opposed to "geographic" accounting, with in-
come being attributable to various functional units of the organization.
Because the evidence showed "a highly integrated business which bene-
fited from an umbrella of centralized management and controlled inter-
action," internal accounting and source of income was irrelevant.
2 7 2
269 Id. The unitary business method of income division applied in Mobil was not a new concept,
being traceable to preincome tax cases. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307
n.14 (1982). But Mobil was important in highlighting the modem elements of the "factors of profi-
tibility" (functional integration, centralization of management and economies of scale) which the
Court considered relevant in finding a unitary business. Over the years the Court had been criticized
for failing to adequately define a unitary business. For a discussion of various aspects of the unitary
business method, see G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION
101 (2d ed. 1950); Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate-Multina-
tional Business, 10 URBAN LAW. 181 (1978); Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Appor-
tionment and the Circumscription of a Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAx J. 487 (1968); Keesling &
Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGs L.J. 42 (1960); Palestin,
Interstate Taxation: Non-Unitary Corporation--Should Statutory Apportionment Yield to Separate
Accounting? 58 NAT'L TAX ASs'N 531 (1965); Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The
Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REv. 171 (1970); Comment,
State Taxation of a Unitary Business, 8 FORDHAM L.J. 819 (1980); and C. McClure, Jr., Defining
Unitary Business: An Economist's View (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
1125, 1983).
270 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
271 Id. at 223 nn.7-8.
272 Id. at 224. Needless to say, the expansion of formulary apportionment in Mobil and treatment
of the separate accounting method in Exxon set off another round of reaction to the laxing Supreme
Court protection of interstate commerce from state taxation. See, eg., Dexter, Tax Apportionment
of the Income of a Unitary Business. An Examination of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of
Vermont, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REv. 107; Keesling, The Impact of the Mobil Case on Apportionment of
Income, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REv. 87 (Mobil "is a landmark case in the area of tax law relating to the
allocation and apportionment of income for state tax purposes"); Note, State Taxation of Multistate
and Multinational Businesses, 34 TAX LAW. 431 (1981). There have been repeated calls for some
definite congressional legislation to clarify the area. E.g., Killefer, State Taxes on Commerce: Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 8 J. CORP. TAX. 3, 18 (1981); Nachenson & Fein-
schreiber, The Unitary Method of State Taxation after Mobil and Exxon, 11 TAX ADVISER 708, 716
(1980); Comment, Constitutional Law-State Taxation of Foreign Source Dividend Income, 11 MEM.
ST. U.L. Rv. 267, 278 (1981). The decisions also excited the international community. Eg.,
Kocot, State Taxation of Foreign Source Divided Income, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1023 (1980);
604
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Just as it appeared that Mobil and Exxon would give states an ex-
pansive license to tax multijurisdictional enterprises, two companion
cases which the Supreme Court decided in 1982 closed the door some-
what. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho St. Tax Comm'n,2 73 and F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department2 7 questioned whether the re-
spective states of Idaho and New Mexico could include in the apportion-
able tax base of foreign corporations items of intangible income received
from their respective subsidiaries which had no business activities in the
state. Each state Supreme Court had upheld the respective tax after find-
ing that the taxpayer was engaged in a unitary business, on the authority
of Mobil and Exxon.27 5 The taxpayers presented evidence showing that
the intangible income in question was attributable exclusively to foreign
business, thereby satisfying the evidenciary standard of Mobil. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court held that the income was not unitary busi-
ness income subject to apportionment, and the Supreme Court reversed
both cases.276
Neither Mobil, Exxon, ASARCO, nor Woolworth addressed the con-
stitutionality of worldwide combined reporting, which includes income
from sources outside the United States in the tax base of a unitary busi-
Taxation: Inclusion of Foreign Source Dividend Income in State Apportionment Formula, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 491 (1981).
273 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
274 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
275 Taxation and Revenue Dep't v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 95 N.M. 519, 526-29, 624 P.2d 28, 35-
38 (1981), rev'd 458 U.S. 354 (1982); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 102 Idaho 38, 624 P.2d 946 (1981), rev'd 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
276 For a general discussion, see The Supreme Court 1981 Term: State Corporate Income Taxa-
tion, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1, 86-96 (1982), and Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdic-
tional Corporations, Part IL Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1982).
In ASARCO, the Court attempted to distinguish Mobil when applying its evidenciary standard by
focusing on the independent operations of the parent and subsidiaries. 458 U.S. at 315-20. But the
holding undoubtedly was influenced by Idaho's concession that the case did not involve a classic
single unitary business, but attempted to redefine the principal to encompass "corporate purpose."
458 U.S. at 326. Consequently, the case was criticized for failing to adequately address the definition
of unitary business. Floyd, The 'Unitary' Business in State Taxation: Confusion at the Supreme
Court?" 1982 B.Y.U.L. REV. 465-66; Hellerstein, supra at 172-73. The decision was also heavily
criticized by the dissenting justices for failing to take into account the economic realities in the
receipt of income by the parent. 458 U.S. at 331-53.
As for Woolworth, the Court criticized the lack of preparation by the state on the issue of
determining the existence of a unitary business. 458 U.S. at 360 ("[r]egrettably, it needs to be said
that the State did a very poor job of inquiring into and developing the facts in this case"). The state
was content to rest the constitutionality of its statute on the presumption of correctness in state
taxation and the taxpayer's "potential" for operating its company as a unitary business. Id. at 360-
61. See Floyd, supra at 477-78. Due to the lack of evidence presented by the state, the Court
examined the taxpayer's evidence, and concluded that there was not a unitary business "on the basis
of undisputed facts." 458 U.S. at 369.
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ness.277 In June, 1983, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
California's worldwide combined reporting in Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Bd.278 California's franchise tax was imposed
on a Delaware corporation engaged in the manufacture of paperboard
packaging both within and outside California. Although the taxpayer's
operations were largely domestic, a number of controlled subsidiaries
were engaged in similar business activities in foreign countries. Califor-
nia included income earned from these overseas subsidiaries in the total
state tax base subject to apportionment. The corporation argued that the
subsidiaries were not part of a unified business, and that ASARCO and
Woolworth precluded inclusion of the income in its tax base. But the
Court disagreed, finding the facts more in accord with Mobil and Exxon,
and holding that the entire worldwide operations formed a single unitary
business, the total income of which was subject to apportionment.27 9
VI. SOLUTIONS TO MULTIPLE TAXATION
A. International Business
Because international and interstate taxation of multijurisdictional
business enterprises each requires resolution of competing jurisdictional
claims, and proper determination and division of income to avoid multi-
ple taxation, the tendency to compare State and Federal systems of taxa-
tion is natural. Interestingly, this tendency dates back to early
discussions of multiple taxation from both international and interstate
277 Specifically, the inclusion of foreign income is referred to as "worldwide combined reporting."
"Under combined reporting, the separate corporate elements of a unitary business prepare a single
report which sums the results of their individual activities and assigns the appropriate portion of
profit or loss to the individual corporate elements and states on the basis of an apportionment
formula." A combined report is not synonymous with a consolidated tax return provided under the
Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 1501, but merely represents an information report. GAO REPORT,
supra note 126, at 5. A combined report aggregates the total net income of a multijurisdictional
enterprise, eliminating intercompany transactions required under I.R.C. § 482. Note, State Taxa-
tion of Foreign-Source Income: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 805,
815 n.56 (1981).
278 463 U.S. 159 (1983). For a general discussion of the history and operation of combined re-
porting in California, see Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allo-
cation Practices, 42 J. TAX'N 106 (1975).
279 463 U.S. at 180, 184. As of July 1, 1982, thirteen states applied worldwide combined report-
ing. GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 66. Following the decision in Container Corp., a number of
states adopted the approach. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.135 (West 1985 Supp.).
The Container Corporation was a domestic corporation which was required to include foreign
subsidiary corporations under California's worldwide combined reporting approach. Still to be re-
solved is the issue of whether a non-U.S. corporation with operations in the U.S. can be required by a
state to include its non-U.S. operations in a combined report. See Javaras & Browne, Litigation
Prospects After Container: The Foreign Parent Issue, Tax Notes, Dec. 19, 1983 at 1027.
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perspectives.28
As discussed in Part II, the League of Nations, with encouragement
from the International Chamber of Commerce, began a movement to fos-
ter international cooperation to minimize double taxation, and produced
a report in 1923 which four leading international economists, including
Professor Seligman prepared.28' During this period, the NTA com-
menced its efforts to achieve interstate uniformity,28 2 and because Profes-
sor Seligman was a former president of the NTA,2 83 his views on double
taxation undoubtedly influenced the search for a single procedure at both
the interstate and international levels of government.284 Another past-
president of the NTA, Professor Adams of Yale University, who was also
involved in the international arena, representing the United States at in-
ternational conferences on double taxation,285 presented his views at the
1929 NTA conference. 286 After giving a brief history of the efforts of the
League and the progress achieved, with some twenty bilateral treaties
having been concluded, he predicted that within a short period Europe
would have a network of bilateral conventions virtually eliminating
double taxation problems for international enterprises operating in the
region.287 Because countries have conflicting and selfish economic and
political interests, however, Adams did not believe that a bilateral treaty
network could be spread worldwide; the only means of resolving the
problem would be for nations to adopt one uniform multilateral conven-
tion along the lines of the model treaties which the League prepared.288
Adams also recommended that the NTA encourage the American states
to follow the lead set by the League by adopting a uniform law.289
The comparison of international and interstate jurisdictional and
280 For an international perspective, see Carroll, Allocation of Business Income" The Draft Con-
vention of the League of Nations, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 489 (1934), and for an interstate perspec-
tive, see Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, 22 NAT'L TAX ASS'N 193
(1929).
281 See supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
283 Seligman was President of the NTA from 1913-15. Mattersdorf, The National Tax Associa-
tion-Places of Meetings and Officers, 63 NAT'L TAX ASS'N 455, 460 (1970).
284 See Adams, supra note 280, at 193. See also Carroll, Observations of Report of the Committee
of the National Tax Association on Uniformity and Reciprocity in State Tax Legislation, Especially
with Regard to the Allocation of Income of International Enterprises, 24 NAT'L TAX ASs'N 333-45
(1931).
285 Reciprocity in Inheritance Taxation-Report of Committee of the National Tax Association, 22
NAT'L TAX Ass'N 200, 226 (1929). Professor Adams was President of the NTA from 1922-23.
Mattersdorf, supra note 283, at 460.
286 Adams, supra note 280.
287 Id at 193-94.
288 Id. at 194, 196.
289 Id. at 196-97.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:562(1984)
double taxation problems continued at the 1930 annual NTA conference.
A year earlier the International Chamber of Commerce had proposed a
series of principles which would aid in mitigating international double
taxation.29 The NTA's Third Committee studied these principles and in
its annual report, the Committee addressed these principles with item-by-
item committee comment as to whether each principle would apply in
the interstate setting; however, the Committee did not draw any ultimate
conclusions.2 9 '
During the next year, members of the Third Committee devoted ex-
tensive consideration to whether the interstate and international
problems of double taxation could be governed by the same principles.
In its 1931 report, the Third Committee listed six major differences be-
tween international and interstate conditions and relations, and con-
cluded that similar principles could not be applied.2 92 As the myriad of
futile attempts to reach state-level interstate uniformity demonstrated,
voluntary conformity by independent sovereign states is impossible.
Only some type of forced compliance, applicable to all taxing jurisdic-
tions, can provide the vehicle necessary for broad uniformity. Forced
compliance would require the devolution of some of an independent
state's sovereign powers such as is found with a federal-constitutional
authority.
Under a federal system, states surrender a portion of their individual
sovereignty to a central authority through a constitutional compact, and
laws made pursuant to such constitution form the supreme law, notwith-
standing any conflicting state law or constitution.29 3 The most compre-
hensive international institution is the United Nations (UN),294 however,
290 See Edmonds, Report of the Committee of the National Tax Association on Uniformity and
Reciprocity in State Taxing Legislation, 23 NAT'L TAX Ass'N 338, 352 (1930).
291 Id. at 353-56.
292 The six differences were:
1. differences in language in international business necessitating generally differences in the
financial records of the foreign divisions of a business;
2. differences in methods of conducting foreign businesses and interstate commerce;
3. the different theories of profit realization upon which foreign branches and domestic
branches are likely to be based;
4. tariff laws which may affect international but not interstate income taxation;
5. differences in the competitive objectives and motives in domestic and foreign businesses
involving in the case of international business frequently such real but intangible elements
as race or historical prejudices;
6. differences in constitutional limitations on the power to tax.
Gerstenberg, Allocation of Business Income, Report of the Committee of the National Tax Association
on Uniformity and Reciprocity in State Taxation legislation, 24 NAT'L TAX ASS'N 294, 302 (1931).
293 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
294 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1976).
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it is not a centralized government. The UN Charter2 95 sets forth various
purposes and principles, and provides a framework for a potential inter-
national constitution, but it is not by any means the equivalent of the
United States Constitution.2 96 Since the Charter provisions lack an effec-
tive enforcement mechanism its provisions are seen by some as providing
only inspirational messages to guide international relations.29 7 Member
nations of the UN are inclined towards complying with the Charter pri-
marily out of a sense of world opinion, although arguably by some con-
cession of sovereignty. Unlike with a constitutional system, political
issues, such as are involved in determinations of taxation of multinational
enterprises, lie outside the reach of the UN because it lacks an effective
system of authority and enforcement.2 98 Due to the absence of an inter-
national constitutional system,29 9 and the low probability of voluntary
national movement, hope appears dim for an international multilateral
treaty for solving multiple taxation problems. If a multilateral treaty is
unlikely, the question arises whether any means is available for amelio-
rating multiple taxation on an international level. Professor Adams sug-
gested in 1929 the use of model bilateral treaties. Although total
uniformity might be unobtainable, continued improvement and world-
wide acceptance of such treaties appears as the optimum approach to
minimizing international double taxation.
The objective of improving upon a model bilateral treaty was the
guiding principal behind the first recommendations made by the Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on February 15,
1955.30 At that time there existed 70 bilateral treaties patterned after
the model treaties of the League of Nations.30 1 Increasing international
economic interdependence provided an impetus for even greater progress
to be achieved, and consequently the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) and the United States pursued the
model bilateral treaty approach. 2 The model bilateral treaties have met
295 L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A.P. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMEN-
TARY AND DOCUMENTS (3d and revised ed. 1969).
296 J. HALDERMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1-7 (1966).
297 G. SCHVARZENBERGER, supra note 294, at 136.
298 J. HALDERMAN, supra note 296, at 215-16.
299 The original intention of the United Nations was directed towards a constitutional form, but
the goal has been generally dismissed. Id at 1-2. Obviously, if the United Nations, a recognized
international institution, is unable to achieve unity among nations, afortiori, any extant or proposed
ad hoe international organization designed to deal directly with the issues of multiple taxation like-
wise will confront failure.
300 Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital, Report of the OECD Com-
mittee on Fiscal Affairs 7 (1977).
301 Id
302 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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with considerable success, and this appears the proper direction for eas-
ing double taxation on the international level, rather than devoting fruit-
less efforts towards a multilateral convention.3"3 As for division of
income, the model treaties apply the separate-entity/arm's-length ap-
proach,304 which international tax authorities have recommended as the
best approach on the international level.3°5
B. Interstate Business
Over the years, various committees of the National Tax Association
have advocated five general approaches for achieving uniformity in inter-
state taxation; two strictly state-level, two state-federal hybrid methods,
and one strictly federal-level.30 6 As for the two purely state-level ap-
proaches, one calls for a voluntary uniform national state tax system,
while the other proposes regional unity. The NTA has long supported
the national approach, but its long history of futility illustrates the practi-
cal impossibility of attaining such a system. 30 7 Two state-level efforts,
the UDITPA and the MTC, have brought some semblance of conformity
to the area, but neither has been truly successful. 3 8 Although regional
uniformity has not had the same concerted attention, 30 9 difficulties simi-
lar to those faced by national efforts exist for concluding regional
agreements.310
303 The OECD has considered the feasibility of a model multilateral convention, but has rejected
the idea, concluding that "great difficulties" would be met. Model Double Taxation Convention on
Income and on Capital, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 7 (1977).
304 See supra notes 69-112 and accompanying text.
305 E.g., Carroll, supra note 280, at 494; Carroll, supra note 284, at 333. The reason this method
is optimum for international commerce has been explained by the Supreme Court as follows:
Although consistent application of the fair apportionment standard can generally mitigate,
if not eliminate, double taxation in the domestic context, "neither this Court nor this Nation
can ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. If an
instrumentality of commerce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may have the right,
consistently with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on its full value. If a state should seek
to the tax the same instrumentality on an apportioned basis, multiple taxation inevitably results
• ..[d]ue to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation of
taxes is computed on no more than one full value.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 186 (1983), quoting Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447-48 (1979).
306 See Ratliff, Jr., State Taxation of Interstate Commerce" The Case for Federal Control, 55
NAT'L TAX Ass'N 513, 518-20 (1962); Cooperation, supra note 215, at 1335.
307 For the NTA history, see supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
308 Although the vast majority of states having corporate income taxes use the equally weighted
three-factor formula, GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 61, patterned after the UDITPA, much
diversity still exists. See supra notes 200-240 and accompanying text.
309 See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
310 The regional approach attempts to encourage states within a certain economic network to
adopt the same tax system thereby generating uniformity among that block of states. There are at
least four problems with this approach. First, there is the difficulty of defining an economic region.
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The two state/federal hybrid methods suffer similar complaints.
The first hybrid method, which Cox advocated at the 1953 NTA confer-
ence, 311 calls for a national convention of states, with the federal govern-
ment relegated to the role of a neutral moderator. Consequently, some
Committee workers criticized this approach as another form of state-
level approach, subject to the same defects as the other forms.312 The
second method urges an intergovernmental solution, recommending for-
mation of an independent state-federal fiscal agency directly authorized
to mediate a national state tax system.313 But the committees which the
NTA appointed over the years to search for an intergovernmental ap-
proach experienced the identical frustrations as the committees searching
for a state-level approach did, and there is little to suggest that future
intergovernmental efforts would be successful.
With state-level and state/federal hybrid approaches unfeasible, the
remaining hope for national uniformity of state taxation rests in pre-emp-
tive federal action. For the very reason a multilateral treaty is unfeasible
on an international level,314 a single uniform federal law is possible on
the interstate level; the former lacks a constitutional system while the
latter does not. Over the years a number of commentators and congress-
men have advocated federal legislation as the only means of achieving
uniformity.3 15 Two questions, however, stand out as obstacles to a feder-
Of course there are various states dependent upon certain predominate industries, but this does not
mean those states depend exclusively upon one industry for revenue. Second, a regional formula
would have to take into account differences between states as would a national formula. Third, the
problem of resolving national differences remains, with analysis merely shifting from state-level to a
more abstract level of finding an acceptable uniform formula applicable across regional lines. The
regional formula would not relieve multijurisdictional business enterprises from multiple taxation,
the group most in need of a unified system. Finally, and perhaps most critically, the regional ap-
proach is viewed as an interim measure, but as such, it diverts attention from the central issue of
achieving national uniformity. See 51 NAT'L TAX ASS'N 372 (1958).
311 Cox, Congressional Action to Achieve Uniformity in Interstate Allocation of Income, 46 NAT'L
TAX Ass'N 262, 264 (1953).
312 Leo Mattersdorf, Chair of the NTA's Fifth Committee, was extremely skeptical whether such
Congressional input would be helpful. When a question was addressed to Mattersdorf whether the
NTA had ever appointed a committee to recommend a model allocation formula, he responded,
"[w]e have had about six committees, I think. Each recommended a different formula, and none of
them has ever been adopted." Mattersdorf, Should the States Adopt Withholding, 46 NAT'L TAX
ASS'N 271,283 (1953). While sympathizing with the Cox proposal, Mattersdorf questioned whether
it was conceivable that states would "get together any faster under the impetus of a resolution of
Congress than they ha[d] in the past." Id. at 285. After briefly presenting his views, Mattersdorf
concluded, "while I am in favor of what Mr. Cox recommends, I think it will not work and that a
resolution of Congress will not help the matter one iota." Id. at 286.
313 See Martin, Federal-State Tax Cooperation, 34 NAT'L MUNICIPAL REV. 21 (1945).
314 See supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text.
315 E.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 16-67; 1964 REPORT ON STATE TAXATION, supra note
114, at 599; see supra note 220. As early as 1939, the U.S. Department of Agriculture noted that
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ally imposed, nationally uniform state taxation system; one is constitu-
tional, the other political.
Politically, the question is whether Congress can find a solution
states would be willing to accept. Income taxes are a vital source of reve-
nue for states, and states naturally become very defensive against any-
thing which would threaten existing state prerogatives.3 16 The answer
depends on whether Congress can compose unified legislation without
intruding too much upon existing state law which, in turn, requires ex-
amination of the three elements of state law-subject matter, measure,
and rate.
With respect to what activities may be subject to tax, a 1981 federal
study (GAO Report) found the various income tax states used ten differ-
ent criteria for determining jurisdiction over foreign corporations.317
While this seems to evidence wide divergence, the diversity is more se-
mantic than real. States are permitted to tax interstate commerce, and
Public Law No. 86-272 already imposes a uniform minimum jurisdic-
tional level. Thus, the path seems clear for Congress to impose a maxi-
mum jurisdictional level applicable to all states.
As for the measure of the tax, three subissues must be addressed.
The first deals with the appropriate mode of computing net income sub-
ject to division. The second concerns the proper criteria to apply in es-
tablishing a unitary or worldwide combined business for inclusion of
total business income in the tax base subject to division. Third, there
must be a solitary apportionment formula. Although there are many
variations among the states regarding each of these subissues, there is
"[t]he difficulty of making appreciable progress through voluntary state adoption of broad reciproc-
ity agreements suggest the alternative of Federal action." U.S. Department of Agriculture, Barriers
to International Trade in Farm Products 54 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC
1939), reprinted in Kahn, Federal Limitations Upon State Motor Carrier Taxation and Regulation, 32
TEMP. L.Q. 61, 78 (1958). The American Bar Association began study of federal legislation cover-
ing state taxation of multistate business in 1956, making specific suggestions in 1969. A.B.A. Recom-
mendations, supra note 200, at 1041-53 (1959). A minority report severly criticized the resolutions
as committing the A.B.A. to a strictly political issue. Id. at 1054-62. The same criticism had been
voiced earlier by the A.B.A. House of Delegates to a 1967 resolution calling for federal action. Id at
1054-55.
316 Such a defensive reaction helps explain the early state resistance to UDITPA. One main
problem in the history of double taxation lies with interstate business itself. Instead of being content
with being subject to state tax upon one hundred per cent of net income, many businesses had
devised means to shelter portions of income from tax by creating "nowhere income," and have raised
the specter of "double taxation" when such was not an issue. Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income
Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423 (1976).
317 GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 59-60. For criticism of the GAO Report, see Roemer, The
States View of GAO Report, 75 NAT'L TAX Ass'N 152 (1982); Committee on Interstate Commerce of
the N.Y. Bar Ass'n, Congress and the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Tax Notes,
Nov. 7, 1983 at 451.
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nonetheless a large degree of conformity. a
Finally, a federal statute need not, and should not, address the issue
of the rate at which states may impose their income tax. Uniform federal
law regarding jurisdiction and determination of the tax base should elim-
inate the possibility of double taxation of net income, and the revenue
needs and overall fiscal policy of each state would determine the rate of
tax.
3 19
From the political perspective, the stage seems set for a nationally
uniform state income tax system; some states have even called for federal
legislation.320 Opposition, however, will undoubtedly come from advo-
cates of strong states' rights and from some powerful business interests
which find the lack of uniformity to be to their advantage.
The primary constitutional issue is whether the Congress has au-
thority to fully pre-empt issues involving state taxation of interstate com-
merce. Because Public Law No. 86-272 represents the solitary instance
of congressional control over state income taxation, 32 1 and this law has
not had constitutional review by the Supreme Court, no genuine gauge of
the constitutional question is available. The reasoning of the state court
decisions upholding Public Law No. 86-272, however, seems sound,
322
and federal preemptive legislation should be valid.323
The movement towards uniformity begun by the UDITPA and the
MTC has demonstrated the desirability of uniformity and the weaknesses
of anything less than a federally imposed approach. The constitutional
objections to federal legislation seem insubstantial; the political objec-
tions may, however, prove to be insurmountable.
VII. CONCLUSION
An organized search for solutions to the problems of double taxa-
318 The GAO REPORT found 75% of the taxing states based state taxable income upon federal
taxable income. GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 60-61. A large percentage of states also use the
equally weighted three-factor formula, as well as individual treatment in the three factors of prop-
erty, payroll and sales. Id. at 61-65. Finally, there was general agreement over income division and
unitary business. Id. at 65-66.
319 States could adjust tax rates to offset any loss due to the change over to the national system.
Likewise, businesses could lobby individual states to alter rates or provide credits for the benefit of
particular business interests.
320 Brief for Appellants, Jurisdictional Statement at 22-23, United States Steel Corporation v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), 10 Law Reprints, Tax Series No. 1 (1977/78 Term).
321 Cf Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 464 U.S. 7 (1983) (state tax on
gross income of airlines operating within the state was preempted by federal law).
322 See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
323 See P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 247-56 (1953); Hellerstein,
The Power of Congress to Restrict State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 12 J. TAX'N 302, 303-05
(1960).
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tion of multijurisdictional enterprises has been underway for more than a
century at both the international and the interstate levels. A network of
bilateral tax treaties has evolved as the solution at the international level,
because even though a widely adopted multilateral treaty has strong the-
oretical appeal, it has proven to be impractical. Instead, the search has
been for a general framework, in the form of model treaty provisions,
which can bring a common theme, if not uniformity, to bilateral tax trea-
ties. The general scheme of these treaties is to establish standards for the
assertion of taxing jurisdiction, and, if those standards are met, to treat
the business activities within the taxing state as a separate entity, dealing
at arm's length with other elements of the enterprise of which it is a part.
Although it is difficult to administer and ensure compliance with the sep-
arate-entity/arm's-length approach, efforts to refine the concepts in-
volved in the measure of the tax base have been helpful in resolving many
of the troublesome areas. Total uniformity in the international arena
does not seem possible the best that can be hoped for is improving the
existing approach.
Multijurisdictional enterprises have also been troubled by the spec-
ter of double taxation within the United States. Unlike in the interna-
tional arena, however, the United States Constitution has provided some
protections here. The Due Process and Commerce Clause have imposed
some constraints on the states' exercise of their taxing powers, but not to
a degree which requires the states to adopt uniform criteria for jurisdic-
tion and the determination of a taxpayer's tax base. Therefore, double
taxation may still result, but the burden is on the taxpayer to demon-
strate actual double taxation, rather than the likelihood of it because of
the interplay of conflicting states' rules. Also in contrast with the inter-
national arena, it is possible to achieve uniformity within the United
States. The existence of a governmental structure which has powers su-
perior to those of the individual states permits the Congress to enact leg-
islation, binding on all the states, which would provide uniform rules for
asserting tax jurisdiction, and for determining a taxpayer's tax base.
Equally important is that the uniform rules, the statutes, would be sub-
ject to uniform interpretation and application in each of the states. Vol-
untary efforts by the states to adopt uniform rules have been largely
unsuccessful, and recent Supreme Court decisions have given the states
broad discretion to structure their income tax systems. Interstate uni-
formity can only be achieved by Congressional action.
